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California Supreme Court Survey
September 1986-November 1986
The California Supreme Court Survey is a brief synopsis of recent decisions
by the supreme court The purpose of the survey is to inform the readerof the
issues that have been addressed by the supreme cour, as well as to serve as a
startingpointfor researchingany of the topical areas. The decisions are analyzed in accordance with the importance of the court's holding and the extent
to which the court expands or changes existing law. Attorney discipline cases
have been omitted from the survey.
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I.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
A default judgment entered pursuant to discovery
sanctions is not an exception to the general rule
restrictingrecovery to the amount specifically demanded
in the complaint: Greenup v. Rodman.

In Greenup v. Rodman, 42 Cal. 3d 822, 726 P.2d 1295, 231 Cal. Rptr.
220 (1986), the court considered whether a default judgment entered
pursuant to discovery sanctions in excess of the amount prayed for
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court. (See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 2034(b)(2)(C) (West 1983)) [hereinafter section 2034] (repealed operative July 1, 1987 and replaced by section 2024(b)(3)(D), which enables the court to strike a defendant's answer and enter a default
judgment as a penalty for disobeying a discovery order). In general,
where no answer is filed, the plaintiff's relief may not exceed the
amount demanded in the complaint. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580
(West 1976) [hereinafter section 580]. In any other case, section 580
provided that the court may fashion relief consistent with the case.
Thus, the court asked whether striking a defendant's answer as a
sanction for discovery order violations was equivalent to the defendant's having never filed an answer under section 580. The court held
that the defendant was liable only to the extent of the demand in the
complaint.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant fraudulently transferred
assets out of a company in which the plaintiff was a minority stockholder. The complaint prayed for $100,000 in damages. Subsequent
to filing an answer, the defendant, on several occasions had willfully
resisted deposition and document production requests. Pursuant to
section 2034, the plaintiff moved to strike the defendant's answer and
enter a default judgment as a penalty for failure to comply with discovery. The trial court allowed the defendant an opportunity to pay
a fine and produce the requested documents. After the defendant
failed to do so, the court struck his answer and entered the default
judgment.
In a subsequent ex-parte hearing to prove damages, the court
found the defendant liable for $338,000 in compensatory and $338,000
in punitive damages. The defendant appealed, claiming that under
section 580 the trial court had jurisdiction to award damages only up
to the amount of the prayer. The court of appeal held that because
the default was entered pursuant to a discovery sanction, it was an
exception to the general rule limiting recovery to the amount specifically demanded. See generally Note, Default Judgments in Excess of
Prayer,4 STAN. L. REV. 278 (1952).
The supreme court reversed and held that the trial court could not
enter a default judgment award in excess of the amount demanded in
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the complaint. The court reasoned that striking the defendant's answer had the same effect as a total failure to answer by the defendant. The court stated that the purpose of section 580 was to provide
notice to the defendant of the limits of his potential liability, thereby
satisfying his due process rights should a default judgment be entered against him. The court added that to hold otherwise would allow trial courts excessive leeway in determining damages, thus
exposing defendants to limitless liability. In declining to strengthen
discovery sanctions, the court stated that it was more concerned with
due process rights than with furthering the policy behind penalties
for discovery abuse.
In the instant case, the court reduced the punitive damage award
to $100,000, the amount specifically demanded in the complaint. Additionally, the court lowered the $338,000 in compensatory damages
to $15,000. Under section 86 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial
court's jurisdiction was limited to cases in which the amount in controversy exceeded $15,000. The court reasoned that because the
plaintiff's prayer requested an amount which exceeded the jurisdictional requirements of the trial court, the plaintiff was claiming at
least $15,000 in damages. Thus, the court lowered the compensatory
damages to its jurisdictional limit. However, the court allowed the
plaintiff the option to forego this remedy and file an amended complaint. In sum, the supreme court held that a default judgment
award may not exceed the amount demanded in the complaint where
the default was entered pursuant to willful disobedience of discovery
orders.
JAMES A. COULTER, III

II. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. The placement of electronic listening devices in the chapel
of a youth authority school violated the ward's right to
privacy and right to free exercise of religion where the
youth authority could not show that such measures were
necessary to institutionalsecurity: In re Arias.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In In re Arias,1 the court ordered the removal of an electronic lis1. 42 Cal. 3d 667, 725 P.2d 664, 230 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1986). Chief Justice Bird wrote
the majority opinion with Justices Broussard, Reynoso, and Lytle concurring. Justice
Grodin wrote a separate concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Lucas, with whom

tening device that was placed in the Protestant chapel of the youth
authority's Karl Holton School. The court, noting that the language
of section 636 of the Penal Code2 did not require the actual removal
of the listening devices, ordered their removal on section 2600 of the
Penal Code.3 The court concluded that the youth authority failed to
show that the device was necessary to the reasonable security needs
of the institution and therefore, its use was not justified.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

As part of a plan to upgrade security, the youth authority installed
sixty electronic listening devices throughout the Karl Holton School.
One of the microphones was placed in the foyer of the Protestant
chapel and would have been able to monitor sounds above a certain
noise level in the foyer, chapel, and chaplain's office. The device in
the chapel's foyer was part of a larger monitoring system. This monitoring arrangement was to act as an alarm system: when the noise
level in any one of the sixty monitoring locations exceeded a designated threshold level, a warning light would go off in the control
center. 4 If the noise level remained elevated for a certain period of
time, the control room speakers would begin monitoring the sounds,
which would enable the control room guard to identify the cause.5
The device in the chapel was to be set just above the "ambient
noise level," a level just higher than that of normal conversation.
However, no prescribed guidelines for the threshold level existed.6
The chapel microphone was tested but never became operative. 7
When the electronic listening device was set above the ambient noise
level, the test results were as follows: 1) a loud religious service
would activate the alarm;8 2) a normal conversation could be monitored. However, if the conversation took place in the chaplain's office with the door closed, the content of the conversation could not be
Justice Mosk concurred, dissented. Justice Lytle was assigned by the Chairperson of
the Judicial Counsel.
2. CAL. PENAL CODE § 636 (West 1970).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1982).
4. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 674, 725 P.2d at 666, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 507. Each device was
to be set at a distinct threshold level. For instance, the microphone in the gymnasium
would have a much higher threshold level than that in the chapel.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 675, 725 P.2d at 667, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
7. No stay was issued to prevent the youth authority from connecting the
microphone. It appeared that they did not connect it in anticipation of the pending
litigation.
8. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 676, 725 P.2d at 667, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 508-09. This fact was
ascertained as a result of formal tests conducted by the youth authority to determine

where to place the microphone.
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identified.9
In November of 1981, nearly eight months before the actual installation of the chapel device, youth authority wards Escobedo and Sowell petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to enjoin the placement of
the microphone. This action was consolidated with the present action
instituted by wards Arias and Bolton.lO The trial court denied the
petition, followed by a summary denial by the court of appeal.
III.

THE MAJORITY OPINION

The majority used a three-part analysis in determining whether to
order the removal of the devices. First, it analyzed section 636 of the
Penal Code which prohibited the monitoring of conversations by the
youth authority of wards and religious personnel, but did not proscribe actual removal of the devices. Second, it considered section
2600 of the Penal Code which established a "necessary to reasonable
security" standard to limit a prisoner's religious freedom. Finally,
the court examined section 2600 of the Penal Code which required a
three-pronged analysis: 1) whether any violation of rights was involved; 2) whether a reasonable security problem existed; and 3)
whether the deprivation of rights was necessary to the reasonable security needs of the institution.
A.

Section 636 of the Penal Code

The purpose of section 636 of the Penal Code was to protect a person's right of privacy against eavesdropping of private conversations
through the use of electronic monitoring." The relevant portion of
the section provided:
Every person who, without permission from all parties to the conversation,
eavesdrops on or records by means of an electronic or other device, a conversation, or any portion thereof, between a person who is in the physical custody
of a law enforcement officer or other public officer, or who is on the property
of a law enforcement agency or other public agency, and such person's attorney, religious advisor, or licensed physician, is guilty of a felony .... 12

The court interpreted this broad statutory language as a prohibition
9. Id. at 676, 725 P.2d at 668, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 509. These findings were a part of
the chaplain's informal tests.
10. The present posture of wards Escobedo and Sowell was not contained in the
opinion. However, the court related that neither Bolton nor Arias were wards of the
authority at the time of the appeal. The court summarily disregarded this mootness
issue by stating that the issue was of great public concern and would continue to occur.
Id&at 673 n.1, 725 P.2d at 665 n.1, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 506 n.1.
11. Id. at 680, 725 P.2d at 670, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 510.
12. CAL. PENAL CODE § 636 (West 1970). The court noted that the statute cannot

against monitoring even informal conversations between a group of
wards and a religious advisor, but did not forbid the monitoring of a
13
public religious service.
The court dismissed the youth authority's argument that the provisions of section 636 were met because the chaplain's office remained
available for private, unmonitored conservations. 14 The court reasoned that while a literal approach to the statute would be unworkable because chaplain/ward conversations could occur anywhere in
the complex, the statute did not require the chaplain to consistently
retreat to his office for privacy.' 5 The court felt that the solution was
to leave areas traditionally used for such private conversations, including the entire chapel complex, unmonitored.16 As part of its
analysis, the court then determined that the language of section 636
stopped short of barring the existence of the device in the chapel.
B. Section 2600 of the Penal Code
In recognizing the possible abuse of the monitoring system and the
potential chilling effect on the free exercise of religion that might be
caused by the presence of the unconnected device, the court focused
upon section 2600 of the Penal Code.' 7 The court first reviewed section 1705 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which specifically
dealt with the religious freedom of youth authority wards.' 8 The actual language of section 1705 provided that persons in youth authority custody "shall be afforded reasonable opportunities to exercise
religious freedom."1 9 After examining the legislative history of this
section, the court concluded that, although the statute did not require
employment of a "necessity" standard, the California legislature intended that the provision conform to the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Cruz v. Beto.20
In Cruz, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner should be afforded "a reasonable opportunity of pursuing his faith."21 The Court,
be defeated by merely informing the parties that their conversations were being monitored. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 680-81 n.11, 725 P.2d at 670 n.11, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 511 n.11.
13. Id. at 681, 725 P.2d at 671, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
14. Id. See generally Annotation, Provision of Religious Facilitiesfor Prisoners,
12 A.L.R. 3D 1276 (1967).
15. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 681, 725 P.2d at 671, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 512.
16. Id. See generally 60 AM. JUR. 2D Penal and CorrectionalInstitutions § 46
(1972); 72 C.J.S. Prisons §§ 91-95 (1987).
17. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1982).
18. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1705 (West 1984).
19. Id.
20. 405 U.S. 319 (1972). See generally Special Project, FourteenthAnnual Review
of CriminalProcedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1983-1984,
73 GEO. L.J. 249, 813-32 (1984).
21. Cruz, 405 U.S. at 322.
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analyzing in dicta Lee v. Washington,22 concluded that racial segregation in prisons would not be tolerated unless it was necessary to
prison security and discipline.23 The Arias court, which combined
the Cruz and Lee holdings, pronounced that the United States
Supreme Court "indirectly" established a standard which would permit interference with religious rights only when necessary. 24 The
court admitted, however, that the interpretation of the Cruz decision
had resulted in seven different standards being applied by various
courts. 25 Thus, the majority stated that "this court need not enter
this briar patch, since another statute [section 2600 of the Penal
Code] resolves petitioners' religious freedom claims."26
Section 2600 of the Penal Code provides:
A person sentenced to imprisonment in a state prison may, during any such
period of confinement, be deprived of such rights, and only such rights, as is
necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the institution
in
27
which he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public."

The court determined that, even though the language of section 2600
seemed to apply only to inmates in state prisons, the decision in DeLancie v. Superior Court28 mandated the applicability of the section
to youth authority wards. 29 Since the applicability of section 2600
was based on an equal protection rationale, this portion of the court's
holding was limited to situations where the challenged measures
30
taken by the youth authority were taken solely for security reasons.
Subsequently, the court decided that the electronic listening system
was implemented purely for security purposes and, as such, section
31
2600 applied.
22. 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
23. Id. at 334.
24. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 685, 725 P.2d at 674, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 515 (citing Comment,
The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated,125 U. PA. L. REV. 812, 852 (1977)).
25. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 686, 725 P.2d at 674, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
26. Id. at 687, 725 P.2d at 675, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
27. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600 (West 1982).
28. 31 Cal. 3d 865, 647 P.2d 142, 183 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1982) (holding that section 2600
of the Penal Code applied to pretrial detainees where routine monitoring of their conversations occurred).
29. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 687, 725 P.2d at 675, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 516.
30. Id. at 687-88, 725 P.2d at 675-76, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 516-17. See In re Eric J., 25
Cal. 3d 522, 601 P.2d 549, 159 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1979) (discussion of the underlying equal
protection analysis: juveniles are incarcerated for rehabilitation purposes, but adults
are imprisoned for punishment).
31. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 688, 725 P.2d at 677, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 517.

C.

The Application of section 2600 of the Penal Code

The court began by promulgating a three-pronged test for deciding
all claims under section 2600. The inquiry was to be conducted as follows: "(1) Are any 'rights' implicated? (2) If they are, does a 'reasonable security' problem exist which might permit a deprivation of
rights under the statute; and (3) if so, to what extent are deprivations
of those rights 'necessary' to satisfy reasonable security interests?"32
1.

The rights involved

The court noted that the starting point for its analysis must begin
with the determination of what religious rights nonconfined citizens
possessed. 33 Declaring that both the federal and state constitutions
guarantee such rights, 34 the court undertook a review of testimony to
evaluate whether the presence of a microphone infringed upon these
rights. Testimony of four clergymen revealed that the installation of
electronic listening devices would have a chilling effect on the wards'
religious freedoms. 35 The youth authority rebutted this testimony by
introducing evidence that the Associated California State Service and
some members of the State Advisory Committee on Institutional
Religion felt that a monitoring system would not unduly interfere
with the wards' rights. However, this information was summarily re36
jected by the majority in a footnote.
The youth authority then attempted to defend its position by pointing out that the chaplain's office was unmonitored. 37 The court refuted this position by noting that the test results were inconclusive
and, therefore, there was no proof that complete privacy existed in
that office.38 Finally, the youth authority revealed that the chaplain
had the authority to order the microphone to be turned off.39 Pronouncing that the chaplain's decision on the matter was not final, the
court concluded that the issue was not the chaplain's religious freedom, but the wards.' 40 Thus, under this view, the youth authority
was required to give its permission before the device could be discon32. Id. at 689, 725 P.2d at 677, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 518. See generally Comment, ConstitutionalRights in Prison: The Standard of Review in California, 16 PAC. L.J. 1077

(1985).
33. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 691, 725 P.2d at 678, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 519.
34. Id. at 692, 725 P.2d at 679, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 520. See also U.S. CONST. amend. I;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4.
35. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 692, 725 P.2d at 679, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
36. Id. at 694 n.29, 725 P.2d at 680 n.29, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 521 n.29.
37. Id. at 695, 725 P.2d at 681, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
38. Id. The court refused to grant deference to the trial court's factual finding
that the office conversations could not be overheard. The court stated that the lower
court did not base its finding on the "credibility of live testimony." Id.
39. Id. at 695-96, 725 P.2d at 681-82, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23.
40. Id. at 696, 725 P.2d at 682, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
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nected.41 Following this review, the court surmised that the presence
of the microphone would have a chilling effect on the wards' right to
freedom of religion. 42
2.

The Existence of a reasonable security problem

The court began this phase of its analysis by defining the standard
for determining whether a reasonable security problem existed. This
definition specified that "reasonable" meant something more than a
good faith belief, taking into account the youth authority's experience and expertise in such matters. 43 The petitioners noted that no
prior history of violent attacks on religious personnel or wards existed in the youth authority system. The youth authority, however,
produced a record indicating "'gang confrontations, escapes, sexual
attacks on younger, weaker wards, and various contraband problems,
ranging from hidden narcotics to 'ripping off' the chaplain's sacramental wine.' "44 Thus, the court admitted that a reasonable threat
to security existed.45
3. The Necessity of Deprivations Standard Applied to Reasonable
Security Interests
In employing the "necessity" standard, the court reasoned that the
burden of proof rested upon the youth authority to establish that less
restrictive means for solving the security problem did not exist. 46 In

order to meet this burden of proof, the youth authority argued that
the only protection afforded a chaplain was an electronic beeper button which the chaplain could push in an emergency. 47 The youth authority asserted that such protection was inadequate because the
chaplain's beeper could be taken, leaving him defenseless.48 The
court, however, rejected this contention stating that it was insufficient to show the least restrictive means. It theorized that the moni41. Id.
42. Id. at 696, 725 P.2d at 682, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 696-97, 725 P.2d at 682, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
45. Id. at 696, 725 P.2d at 682, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 523.
46. Id. at 697, 725 P.2d at 682, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 523 (citations omitted). The court
cited Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976), as
standing for the proposition that anytime a fundamental right was involved, the burden of proof rested upon the government. Id. at 914, 553 P.2d at 570, 132 Cal. Rptr. at
410.
47. Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 698, 725 P.2d at 683, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
48. Id. at 698 n.37, 725 P.2d at 683 n.37, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 524 n.37.

toring system was the same throughout the school; therefore,
inadequate consideration was given to the special needs of the
chapel.49 In addition, the record failed to reveal that the youth authority had considered other measures, such as utilizing technologically improved beepers which would sound an alarm if the chaplain
experienced a sudden movement or requiring that the chapel be
locked unless the chaplain was present. 50 The court concluded, "[i]n
the absence of a more substantial showing that the YA [youth authority] has explored the effectiveness of less intrusive alternatives
and found them to be ineffective, this court cannot hold that the
sound monitoring system is truly 'necessary' for institutional
51
security."

IV.
A.

THE SEPARATE OPINIONS

Justice Grodin's Concurring and DissentingOpinion

Justice Grodin agreed with the majority's conclusion that section
636 of the Penal Code prohibited monitoring of conferences between
wards and religious personnel.52 He observed, however, that the requirements of that section were fulfilled since the chaplain's office
remained available for unmonitored conversations. 53 Justice Grodin
stressed that nothing in section 636 required the youth authority to
leave all areas traditionally used for chaplainward conversations unmonitored.54 Thus, as long as the youth authority provided "adequate facilities for such confidential conversations," section 636 was
55
not violated.
Based on section 2600 of the Penal Code, Justice Grodin registered
his assent with the majority's reversal of the lower court's decision.
After examining the chilling effect on freedom of religion if the system were abused, the Justice maintained that the system would be
valid if a set of regulations were established to insure that the devices
were being used properly. 56 In conclusion, Justice Grodin agreed
that the connection of the chapel microphone should have been enjoined, but only until the time when "adequate regulations limiting
the use of the system in a manner that serves the security interest of
49. Id. at 699, 725 P.2d at 683, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 524. The court, however, ignored
the fact that each microphone's threshold level could be set separately.
50. Id. at 699, 725 P.2d at 684, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 525.
51. Id. at 700, 725 P.2d at 684, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 525. Thus, the court ordered the
removal of the device and denied the petition for habeas corpus since none of the petitioners were in youth authority custody at the time of the ruling.
52. Id. at 701, 725 P.2d at 685, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 526 (Grodin, J., concurring and
dissenting).
53. Id. at 702, 725 P.2d at 685-86, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 527-28.
54. Id. at 702, 725 P.2d at 686, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 703-04, 725 P.2d at 687-88, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 528-29.
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the facility, but that does not unnecessarily intrude on religious services or counseling sessions" were promulgated.5 7
B. Justice Lucas' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Lucas felt that since section 1705 of the Welfare and Institutions Code specifically addressed the religious rights of youth authority wards, it, and not section 2600, should govern.5 8 Applying the
"reasonable opportunity" standard of section 1705, the Justice found
that the youth authority was justified in the installation of the listening system.5 9 He explained that, after having held extensive evidentiary hearings on both the security risks involved and the electronic
monitoring system benefits, the trial court justifiably determined
that the device in the chapel was permissible.60 Justice Lucas then
pointed out that such a finding should have been given greater
6
weight. l
The Justice also objected to the majority's placement of the burden
of proof on the youth authority. 62 Justice Lucas cited the United
States Supreme Court decision in Bell v. Wolfish 63 as controlling on
this issue. 64 He argued that in Bell the court held that the prison inmates must show that the infringement of their first amendment
rights was the result of an "exaggerated response" on the part of the
prison authorities to a security risk.65 Justice Lucas, reinforcing his
position, quoted In re Cummings,6 6 in which the California Supreme
Court made the following comment: "Rights of privacy, like associational rights, are necessarily and substantially abridged in a prison
setting."67
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority's holding that section 2600 of the Penal Code con57. Id. at 705, 725 P.2d at 688, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
58. Id. at 706, 725 P.2d at 689, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 530 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 709-10, 725 P.2d at 689-90, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 530-31.
60. Id. at 707, 725 P.2d at 689, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 530.
61. Id. at 707, 725 P.2d at 690, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
62. Id. at 708, 725 P.2d at 690, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 531.

63.
64.
65.
66.

441 U.S. 520 (1979).
Arias, 42 Cal. 3d at 708-09, 725 P.2d at 690, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 531.
441 U.S. at 551.
30 Cal. 3d 870, 640 P.2d 1101, 180 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1982) (denial of prisoner's writ

of habeas corpus to permit him overnight visitation privileges with his common law
wife).
67. Id. at 873, 640 P.2d at 1102, 180 Cal. Rptr. at 827.

trolled, even in situations involving the youth authority, may make
obsolete section 1705 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, as well as
all nonrehabilitative juvenile statutes. The placement of the burden
of proof on the youth authority may serve to encourage wards to
challenge all security measures taken by the authority. The failure
of the court to promulgate concrete standards and requirements regarding "less restrictive means" leaves the youth authority in an untenable posture, forcing it to try every possibility before even
minimally infringing on any of the wards' rights.
LINDA M. SCHMIDT

B.

Denying a mentally disorderedsex offender a reduction in
his prison sentence due to "conduct" and "participation"
credits for his stay in a state mental hospital was not a
denial of equal protection of the law: In re Huffman.

In In re Huffman, 42 Cal. 3d 552, 724 P.2d 475, 229 Cal. Rptr. 789
(1986), the petitioner, Billy Ray Huffman, was convicted after pleading guilty to forcible rape which resulted in great bodily injury to a
ten year old girl. He was adjudged a mentally disordered sex offender [hereinafter MDSO] and was committed for treatment in a
state mental hospital. After less than three years, he withdrew from
the hospital treatment programs. At that time, he was not amenable
to further treatment and was returned to the criminal courts for
sentencing.
At the sentencing hearing, Huffman claimed that his prison sentence was subject to reduction for "conduct" and "participation" credits attributable to his hospital stay, even though the MDSO laws
make no provisions for such credits. The petitioner based his argument on the fact that since these credits are allowed by the statutes
governing offenders committed for treatment as narcotics addicts, the
principles of equal protection require that they be applied to
MDSO's.
The trial court and the court of appeal refused to grant the credits.
The petitioner then sought a writ of habeas corpus which was
granted by the supreme court. The court, however, rejected the petitioner's claim on the merits: the petitioner was adjudged an MDSO
under former sections 6300 to 6331 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code, which were repealed in 1981 and replaced by sections
1364 to 1365 of the Penal Code. Even so, the former MDSO law remains applicable to the petitioner because he was committed under
its provisions. When a defendant is found to be an MDSO who is
amenable to treatment, the court will commit him to the Department
of Mental Health for confinement in a state hospital. At that time,

[Vol. 14: 701, 1987]

California Supreme Court Survey
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

the committing court or the Board of Prison Terms is required to
compute the longest term of imprisonment for the underlying offenses, which represents his maximum term of commitment as an
MDSO, beyond which he may not be kept in actual custody. The patient may be transferred back to the Department of Corrections facility if he is not amenable to treatment in a state hospital.
Amenability to treatment is not a prerequisite to extended commitment, though the patient must be offered treatment in any facility to
which he is confined.
In an earlier case, People v. Saffell, 25 Cal. 3d 223, 599 P.2d 92, 157
Cal. Rptr. 897 (1979), the court held "that the statutory exclusion of
conduct and participation credits from computation of an MDSO's
'maximum term of commitment' did not deny equal protection of the
laws." Huffman, 42 Cal. 3d at 557, 724 P.2d at 478, 229 Cal. Rptr. at
792. The court, in applying the strict scrutiny standard of equal protection analysis, found a compelling interest that was necessarily
served by the MDSO statute's rule of exclusion. The Saffell court
reasoned that the primary purpose of MDSO commitment is treatment not punishment, which requires flexibility in keeping the
MDSO patient in hospital confinement. The Saffell court provided
several reasons why conduct and participation credits were not suitable to MDSO hospital commitment:
First, the promise that nondisruptive hospital conduct will result in a shorter
commitment is incompatible with treatment for a sex offender. Second, the
threat of return to prison is adequate incentive to avoid misbehavior....
Third, there is no evidence that state hospitals provide ... activities for which
participation credit may be earned in prison. Fourth, state hospitals are not
administratively equipped to compute the credits. Fifth, 'good time' credits
are meaningless in the context of a commitment which can be extended
indefinitely.

Id.
Furthermore, in People v. Sage, 26 Cal. 3d 498, 611 P.2d 874, 165
Cal. Rptr. 280 (1980), the court held that the provisions of the Penal
Code which provide for good conduct and participation credits in various circumstances apply only to time confined in a jail or prison.
Therefore, an MDSO returning for sentencing after a hospital stay
could not claim he had earned such credits during his confinement in
the state mental hospital. The Sage court affirmed Saffell's holding
that the refusal to allow MDSO's conduct and participation credits
does not violate an individual's equal protection rights.
The petitioner contended that two developments have undermined
the rulings of Saffell and Sage. First, prospective application of statutes governing commitment of narcotics addicts which provide for

conduct and participation credits was held to be in violation of equal
protection principles. Second, a new limited voluntary treatment
scheme for MDSO's which expressly allows inmates to earn conduct
and participation credits during their hospital stay was instituted.
However, the court had expressly held that the legislature did not
violate the equal protection clause when it altered the scheme for
treating sex offenders while providing that persons committed under
the prior system would remain subject to its provisions. Baker v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. 3d 663, 670, 677 P.2d 219, 223-24, 200 Cal. Rptr.
293, 297-98 (1984). Moreover, the court listed several compelling reasons for the disparity in credit treatment between narcotics offenders
and MDSO's. First, narcotics offenders are not eligible for the participation credit program until all but the last two years of their sentence has been served. Also, narcotics offenders may not be placed
on outpatient status before their sentence expires and must serve a
supervised post-sentence parole. Finally, narcotics offenders would
be unlikely to volunteer for treatment if they were unable to earn
conduct and participation credits. Therefore, the court found constitutional justification for the disparity in credit eligibility.
The court did acknowledge that involuntary hospital commitments
affect the liberty interest so as to invoke strict scrutiny review of disparities in treatment. However, the court found that this did not require them to hold that any benefit granted to one category of nonprison confinement must automatically be accorded to all others. Society retains a compelling interest in the more stringent treatment
and confinement of MDSO's for purposes of public safety. Also, the
objectives of hospital confinement and penal confinement are separate, and the benefits and burdens of each are distinct. Therefore,
the court held that the disparity in participation credit allowances between the MDSO law and the narcotic offenders statutes does not
deny MDSO's equal protection of the law.
JEFF BOYKIN

C. Peremptory challenges based on group bias which exclude
blacks from juries violate a defendant's right to be tried by
a representative cross-section of the community, as well as
the equal protection clause: People v. Turner.
I.

INTRODUCTION

1

In People v. Turner, the court held that the use of peremptory
1. 42 Cal. 3d 711, 726 P.2d 102, 230 Cal. Rptr. 656 (1986). The majority opinion
was written by Justice Mosk, with Chief Justice Bird, Justices Broussard, Reynoso,
and Grodin concurring. A concurring opinion was authored by Justice Panelli in
which Justice Lucas concurred.
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challenges to remove jurors because of group bias, rather than on the
2
grounds of a "specific bias on the part of the individual juror," violated the defendant's right to a trial by a jury from a representative
cross-section of the community. This decision affirmed the court's
previous holding in People v. Wheeler.3 Furthermore, the court, following the United States Supreme Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, 4 held that the systematic exclusion of jurors based upon race
constitutes a violation of the equal protection clause. Accordingly,
the defendant's conviction in the case at bar was reversed. 5
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The defendant, a black man, was charged with the murders of a
white man and a white woman. It was alleged that each of the
murders occurred during the course of a robbery. The jury found the
defendant guilty on all counts and found true the special circumstance of murder in the course of a robbery. The jury returned a ver6
dict for the death penalty.
The defendant argued that the prosecutor's use of the peremptory
challenges at the trial was improper.7 The jury, as it was ultimately
composed, did not have any black members.8 The defendant contended that the peremptory challenges used to strike three prospective black jurors were based upon racial bias, thereby violating his
right to be tried by a representative cross-section of the community. 9
The prosecutor excluded only two of the first twelve prospective
jurors by exercising peremptory challenges. Both of these two prospective jurors were black.1o When the court met again on the following morning, the defendant made a motion for mistrial based
upon the fact that the jury did not represent an adequate cross-section of the community." The prosecutor, who was then asked to "explain,"12 replied that the first juror excluded was a truck driver who
2. Id. at 721, 726 P.2d at 108, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
3. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
4. 106 S. Ct. 1712 (1986). See also Note, Batson v. Kentucky: The Court's Response to the Problem of Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 36 CASE W.
REs. 581 (1986).
5. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 728, 726 P.2d at 112-13, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 666-67.
6. Id. at 715, 726 P.2d at 103, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 657.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 718, 726 P.2d at 105, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 659.

11. Id.
12. Id.

had a "great deal of difficulty in even understanding the questions
that were being given."' 3 The prosecutor excused the second black
14
juror, a hospital administrator, because of "something in her work."'
Upon receipt of the prosecutor's explanations, the trial court denied
the defendant's motion.15
Subsequently, another black juror replaced a juror who was excused by the defendant. 16 This juror was also excused by the prosecutor by way of a peremptory challenge.17 The prosecutor later
stated that "it was clear ...that she could not sit impartially because
she was a mother of children. . . ."18 Ms. Shepard was the last prospective jury member challenged by the prosecutor. The defendant
objected again, but to no avail. Thereafter, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to death by an all white jury.19
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

Majority Opinion

1. The Right to be Tried by a Representative Cross-section of the
Community
In deciding this case, the court primarily relied on the precedent
established in People v. Wheeler.20 The court in Wheeler stated that
"the use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on
the sole ground of group bias violates the right to trial by a jury
drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under
article I, section 16, of the California Constitution."21 The defendant
13. Id. at 722, 726 P.2d at 108, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 662.
14. Id. at 725, 726 P.2d at 110, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 664.
15. Id. at 718, 726 P.2d at 105, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 659.
16. Id. at 720, 726 P.2d at 106, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 726, 726 P.2d at 111, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 665.
19. Id. at 720, 726 P.2d at 107, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 660-61.
20. 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
21. Id. 22 Cal. 3d at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (1978). The
court in Wheeler relied on People v. White, 43 Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954), to reach
its conclusion:
The White opinion did not specify which Constitution-state or federal-it
was relying on as the source of its declared requirement of cross-sectionalism,
but simply spoke in broad terms of the 'American system' and the 'American
tradition.' California, of course, is an integral part of that system and tradition; and as we noted above, our courts have long recognized that the right to
an impartial jury is an inseparable element of the jury trial guarantee of article I, section 16, of the California Constitution. Accordingly, we now make explicit what was implicit in White, and hold that in this state the right to trial
by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community is guaranteed equally and independently by the [s]ixth [a]mendment to the federal
Constitution and by article I, section 16, of the California Constitution.
Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 272, 583 P.2d at 758, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900.
See generally

Comment, A Fair Cross-section and Distinctiveness in the Jury Selection Planfor the
Districtof Columbia, 32 CATH. U.L. REV. 985 (1983); Note, Peremptory Challenges and
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contended that the three black prospective jurors were peremptorily
challenged because of their race. Consequently, the defendant
claimed that his right to be tried by an adequate cross-section of the
community was violated.22

2.

Equal Protection Rights

The court also concluded that peremptory challenges based upon
racial bias violate the federal equal protection clause.23 In reaching
this conclusion, the court relied on the recent United States Supreme
Court case of Batson v. Kentucky. 24 Thus, peremptory challenges
based on racial bias not only harm the defendant, but also the "entire
2
community." 5

3.

The Burden of Proof

The majority of the court's analysis focused on the burden of proof
in establishing group discrimination in the jury selection process.
The court followed the Batson v. Kentucky approach for determining
whether the peremptory challenges were racially biased.26 This approach first requires the defendant to make a prima facie showing of
group bias. Once the prima facie case has been established, the burden shifts to the prosecution to convince the court that it had a valid
explanation, other than group bias, for excluding the prospective
jurors.

a.

27

The Defendant's Burden

The court adopted the approach established in People v. Wheeler
for finding a prima facie case of group discrimination:
First (the defendant must]... make as complete a record of the circumstances
as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third... he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are
being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any
the Meaning of Jury Rep esentation, 89 YALE L.J. 1177 (1980); Sullivan, Deterring the
Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 477 (1984).
22. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 715, 726 P.2d at 103, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 657.

23. Id. See also 5 B.

WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW,

§ 369 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984).
24. 106 S.Ct. 1712 (1986).
25. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 716, 726 P.2d at 104, 230 Cal. Rptr. at
26. Id. at 717-18, 726 P.2d at 104-05, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 658-59.
WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, ConstitutionalLaw, § 370
27. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 717, 726 P.2d at 105, 230 Cal. Rptr. at

ConstitutionalLaw,
658.
See generally 5 B.
(8th ed. 1974).
659.

specific bias.

28

Except in cases where group bias is suspected, no reasons need be
given in order for a peremptory challenge to be upheld.29 The court
reasoned that since the trial court asked the prosecutor to explain his
peremptory challenges, there was an implied finding of a prima facie
30
case of group discrimination.
The court further concluded, for the purposes of applying the
Wheeler criteria, that blacks constituted a cognizable group. 31 The
court also found that there was a strong likelihood that the peremptory challenges were based upon racial bias. The first two black jurors that were excused had been victims of crimes themselves, and
would probably not have been excused but for their race. 32 Further33
more, the last black juror was excused for being a mother.
Although other jurors were mothers, they were not peremptorily
challenged. The court concluded that all these factors, weighed to34
gether, put forth a prima facie case of group bias.
b. The Prosecutor's Burden
Since the defendant's prima facie case of group bias had been established, the burden shifted to the prosecutor to justify his peremptive challenges. He had the burden of persuading the court that the
peremptory challenges in question were exercised "on grounds that
were reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties
or witnesses-i.e., for reasons of specific bias . . ... 35 It is the duty of
the court to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation to determine
whether there actually was a "specific bias," not whether the prose3
cutor believed that there was a specific bias. 6
The court was not satisfied with the prosecutor's justifications for
his peremptory challenges. There was no evidence that the truck
driver was mentally incompetent 37 nor that the second excused juror's job would interfere with her judgment.38 In addition, there was
nothing to indicate that a mother could not be impartial.3 9 Furthermore, the lower court failed in its duty to carefully evaluate the pros28. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d at 280, 583 P.2d at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 905 (1978).
29. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 718, 726 P.2d at 105-06, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 659-60. See also
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1069 (West 1985). See generally 41 CAL. JUR. 3D Jury §§ 92-97
(1978).
30. Turner, 42 Cal. 3d at 719, 726 P.2d at 106, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 660.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 726-27, 726 P.2d at 112, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
34. Id. at 720, 726 P.2d at 107, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
35. Id. at 720, 726 P.2d at 107, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 661.
36. Id. at 721, 726 P.2d at 107-08, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 661-62.
37. Id. at 722-23, 726 P.2d at 108-09, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 662-63.
38. Id. at 725-26, 726 P.2d at 110-11, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 664-65.
39. Id. at 727, 726 P.2d at 111-12, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 665-66.
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4
ecutor's explanations.40 Therefore, the judgment was reversed. 1

B.

The Concurring Opinion

Justice Panelli agreed that the conviction must be reversed.42
However, he believed that the trial court should have reached a conclusion as to whether the defendant put forth a prima facie case of
biased exclusion of jurors. 43 He reasoned that absent this ruling, the
prosecution would be unaware of its duty to justify the peremptive
challenges.44
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although there has been no new law established by this case, the
opinion reiterates that peremptive challenges based upon racial bias
will not be tolerated by the courts. This decision should serve as a
warning to both trial lawyers and judges. If the peremptive challenges of a case appear to be discriminatory on the basis of group
identity, the explanation for the challenges must be reasonable. It is
the duty of the trial judge to determine if the justifications given are
reasonable. If they are not, "reversal is automatic." 45
MARIANNE CHIAPUZIO

III.

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A.

Pursuantto section 667(a) of the Penal Code, a sentence
enhancement based on a prior conviction for a serious
felony will be upheld only if proof of the prior serious
felony is limited to matters which were necessarily
decided by the prior conviction: People v. Alfaro.

In People v. Alfaro, 42 Cal. 3d 627, 724 P.2d 1154, 230 Cal. Rptr. 129
(1986), the supreme court affirmed the holding in People v. Jackson,
37 Cal. 3d 826, 694 P.2d 736, 210 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985). See Note, California Supreme Court Survey: People v. Jackson, 12 PEPPERDINE L.
REv. 1156 (1985). In Jackson, the court held that second degree bur40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 727-28, 726 P.2d
at 728, 726 P.2d at
at 728-29, 726 P.2d
at 729, 726 P.2d at

at 112, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 666.
113, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 667.
at 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 667 (Panelli, J., concurring).
113, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 667.

at 728, 726 P.2d at 112, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 666.

glary, when it involved the entry of a residence, could be a "serious
felony" for enhancement purposes.
The court in Jackson relied heavily on the reasoning in People v.
Crowson, 33 Cal. 3d 623, 660 P.2d 389, 190 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1983). See
Note, CaliforniaSupreme Court Survey: People v. Crowson, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 222 (1983). In Jackson, the court construed sections
667 and 1192.7 of the Penal Code to determine that a second degree
burglary could be considered a "serious felony" if it involved the burglary of a residence and included the element of residential entry.
The Jackson court held that section 1192.7 was enacted to deter
criminal behavior, and that serious felonies were not exclusively defined by specific statutory crimes. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d at 832, 694 P.2d
at 739, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 626. The court held that even though the
conviction record of the earlier offense did not specify that the conviction was for a residential burglary, the defendant had admitted for
the purpose of plea bargaining that the earlier burglary was residential. Id. Therefore, the defendant was estopped from denying the
same for sentencing purposes.
In Alfaro, the defendant was found guilty of robbery. Since the defendant had pleaded guilty to a burglary of a residence in 1974, the
trial court imposed a five-year sentence enhancement pursuant to
sections 667 and 1192.7 of the Penal Code, which was upheld by the
court of appeal. The defendant, however, did not admit, as the defendant in Jackson did, that the alleged prior offenses were true.
Therefore, the supreme court reversed the finding of the court of appeal that the sentence enhancement was proper, and held that the
previous conviction for burglary did not qualify as a "serious felony"
as required by section 1192.7. This holding was premised on the fact
that the residential entry was not an element of the prior offense.
Since the lower courts in Alfaro viewed the Jackson reasoning as
dicta, they refused to follow it. The supreme court affirmed that the
Jackson reasoning was controlling and distinguished Alfaro accordingly. As the court noted in Alfaro, the previous conviction upon
which the sentence enhancement was based did not establish that the
defendant entered a residence. Although entry of a residence was alleged in the information, it was not an element of the crime. Therefore, the attorney general was not able to prove the requisite
residential entry by introducing the prior conviction. However, if the
defendant had not denied the prior offense in the subsequent action,
the enhancement would have been permitted, provided that the admission was made with knowledge of the consequences.
It seems clear that the California Supreme Court will continue to
follow the United States Supreme Court with regard to interpreting
a guilty plea as simply an admission of all the elements of the crimi722
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nal charge. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969). However, it remains to be seen whether the radically altered composition
of the California Supreme Court will affect the court's view regarding the use of court records to establish the residential nature of the
burglary. See Alfaro, 42 Cal. 3d at 637-38, 724 P.2d at 1160-61, 230 Cal.
Rptr. at 135-37 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting). See generally
22 CAL. JUR. 3D CriminalLaw § 3365 (Supp. 1986).
RHONDA SCHMIDT

B. A sentence enhancement based on prior serious felony
convictionsfor residential burglary was improper, despite
the inclusion of allegations in the information, where
residentialentry was not an element of the earlier
convictions: People v. Calio.
In People v. Calio, 42 Cal. 3d 639, 724 P.2d 1162, 230 Cal. Rptr. 137
(1986), the prosecution had sought to enhance the defendant's sentence for a burglary conviction by alleging that the defendant had
two prior "serious felony" convictions for residential burglary and attempted residential burglary. Pursuant to section 667 of the Penal
Code, a five-year sentence enhancement may be attached to the defendant's principal sentence for each prior "serious felony" conviction if the defendant's present conviction is also of a serious felony.
In defining "serious felony," section 667 refers to section 1192.7 of
the Penal Code. Section 1192.7(c) includes the crime of residential
burglary among its enumeration of several "serious felonies." CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c)(18) (West 1982). The prosecution argued
that the defendant's prior convictions of burglary and attempted burglary qualified as "serious felony" convictions under section 1192.7.
In addition, the enhancement provision of section 667 mandated that
the defendant's two-year sentence be extended to twelve years in duration-five years for each prior serious felony conviction.
The defendant challenged the status of the prior convictions as "serious felonies." Although the prior convictions involved the crime of
burglary and were committed with respect to residential premises, he
alleged that the prior convictions were not for the crime of "residential burglary." Therefore, he argued that they escaped classification
as "serious felonies." Thus, the defendant concluded that the trial
court's attachment of the two five-year sentence enhancements was
erroneous.
The first issue disposed of by the supreme court was whether the

defendant had adequately preserved for appeal his challenge to the
prior convictions being classified as "serious felonies." Justice Broussard, speaking for the court, noted that the defendant's admission of
the prior convictions at trial was made on the advice of his counsel,
and with the trial judge's express assurance that the issue could still
be raised on appeal. The court concluded that the admission made
under those circumstances did not preclude the defendant's subsequent appeal.
The second and central issue before the court was whether the defendant's prior convictions of burglary and attempted burglary satisfied the "serious felony" standard of sections 667 and 1192.7(c) of the
Penal Code. The court observed that both of the prior convictions involved second degree burglary. The court then distinguished the
crime of second degree burglary from the crime of residential burglary: the former does not require entry into a residence while the
latter does.
The court next observed that the prosecution's information in both
of the defendant's prior cases contained allegations of entry into the
premises. The trial court had found those allegations to be decisive
in establishing that the defendant's prior convictions qualified as residential burglaries. The supreme court, however, disagreed with the
trial court and pointed out that these averments were not essential
elements of second degree burglary.
Accordingly, the court refused to allow the prosecution to capitalize on the prior superfluous allegations of residential entry in order
to bootstrap those prior convictions into convictions of residential
burglary. To allow the prosecution to do otherwise, said the court,
would be to potentially expose the defendant to double jeopardy and
speedy trial violations. Thus, Justice Broussard concluded that the
prior convictions were not "serious felonies." Therefore, the dual
five-year enhancements imposed on the defendant by the trial court
were invalid. See People v. Jackson, 37 Cal. 3d 826, 694 P.2d 736, 210
Cal. Rptr. 623 (1985) (prosecution could not prove that prior burglary
conviction qualified as a "serious felony" under sections 667 and
1192.7 unless residential entry was element of the offense).
MITCHELL F. DISNEY
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C. In a case arisingprior to the passage of "The Victims' Bill
of Rights," where the police prevented a meeting between a
criminal suspect and his counsel who made a diligent
effort to aid his client, the suspect's waiver of Miranda
rights was vitiated and his confession rendered
inadmissible: People v. Houston.
In People v. Houston, 42 Cal. 3d 595, 724 P.2d 1166, 230 Cal. Rptr.
141 (1986), the supreme court held that where the police failed to allow an in-custody suspect under interrogation to meet with his attorney, the suspect's subsequent confession was inadmissible even
though he waived his right to remain silent and to have his counsel
present during the interrogation. The court reasoned that because
the appellant was prevented from making the choice of whether to
see his attorney, his waiver of Miranda rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was not truly knowing and voluntary. The
police conduct was deemed a denial of the appellant's right to counsel
under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. The court
found that Proposition 8, which requires all relevant evidence to be
included in any criminal proceeding, did not affect this case because
the criminal acts in question occurred prior to the passage of the initiative on June 8, 1982. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d), ("The Victims'
Bill of Rights"). See People v. Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193
Cal. Rptr. 692 (1983).
The defendant had been arrested when he attempted to sell cocaine to a narcotics officer. He was properly read his Miranda rights
which he admittedly waived. During interrogation, the defendant
confessed to the charged crimes and was subsequently convicted in
the Superior Court of Contra Costa County for selling cocaine and
conspiracy to sell cocaine in violation of section 11352 of the Health
and Safety Code and section 182 of the Penal Code, respectively.
While the defendant was in custody, the defendant's friends hired
an attorney who had advised the defendant in the past. The attorney
made diligent efforts to speak with his client and prevent the authorities from continuing to question him. The police, however, rebuffed
these efforts and failed to communicate to the defendant that his
counsel was present at the station. Thereafter, the police obtained a
confession. The defendant challenged the admissibility of the confession by arguing that the police deliberately held him incommunicado.
In overturning the conviction and holding the confession to be inadmissable, the court determined that basic Miranda warnings are

necessary prerequisites to a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver, but are not always sufficient. The court reasoned that the defendant's continuing right to revoke a waiver of assistance of counsel
prevented the authorities responsible for his isolation from taking
steps which interfered with the attorney-client relationship. Thus, a
defendant's freedom to exercise this right, if he so desired, rendered
the police duty-bound to inform him of his counsel's presence. By
withholding information essential to the defendant's decision regarding the advice of counsel, the police ensured the waiver's failure of
the test of voluntariness. Therefore, the Houston decision furthered
Miranda's purpose of deterring police misconduct.
The court's decision in this case is contrary to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
In Moran, the police incorrectly told an assistant public defender
who was retained by the suspect's sister that the questioning was
completed when she attempted to contact her client. As a result, she
did not immediately seek to meet with him. Subsequently, the suspect waived his Miranda rights and confessed. The Supreme Court
held that the confession was admissible, finding that federal law was
satisfied when the suspect gave a proper waiver. The majority reasoned that mere ignorance of events outside the interrogation room
did not vitiate the waiver.
In declining to follow the United States Supreme Court's view, the
California Supreme Court gave the high court's ruling "respectful
consideration" but emphasized the court's power to provide greater
individual protection under state law. However, under Proposition 8,
"all relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding." CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(d). The application of the result in this
case was limited to unlitigated cases wherein the criminal conduct occurred prior to the date the initiative was passed. See People v.
Smith, 34 Cal. 3d 251, 667 P.2d 149, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692 (1983). Therefore, unless Proposition 8 is repealed, the holding in this case will
have minimal impact on future cases.
SARAH

D.

A.

FUHRMAN

Where the criminal conduct occurred prior to the 1985
amendments, enhancement provisions of the Penal Code
did not apply when a criminal who pled guilty to a felony
subsequently committed a felony while releasedfrom
custody pending sentencing on the earlier offense: People

v. Overstreet.
In People v. Overstreet, 42 Cal. 3d 891, 726 P.2d 1288, 231 Cal. Rptr.
213 (1986), the issue addressed was whether the enhancement provi-
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sions under former section 12022.1 of the California Penal Code
[hereinafter section 12022.1], applied when the appellant committed a
second offense while released from custody pending sentencing for
an earlier offense to which he had pled guilty. The supreme court
held in the negative, basing its opinion on a strict construction of the
statute and a determination of legislative intent.
The defendant had pled guilty to receiving stolen property and was
released on his own recognizance pending a separate determination
of his sentence. Prior to sentencing, the defendant committed additional offenses and thereafter, entered into another plea bargain.
The defendant pled guilty to involuntary manslaughter and a firearm
use allegation. Additionally, he submitted to the trial court the
charge of commission of a felony while released from custody pending trial. The Superior Court of San Diego County held against the
defendant and sentenced him to consecutive terms for each of his
crimes. The court included a two-year enhancement for commission
of a felony while released from custody. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court but the supreme court reversed as to the application of the sentence enhancement.
Pursuant to former section 12022.1, a penalty enhancement applied
when a felony was committed by a person while "released from custody on bail or on his or her own recognizance pending trial on an
earlier felony offense." CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.1 (West 1982) (emphasis added). See 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law §§ 3368, 3377
(1986). In Overstreet, sentencing was the sole proceeding remaining
on the earlier crime at the time of the later crimes. Thus, there was
no trial pending. Therefore, the question was whether sentencing
was encompassed within the meaning of the term "pending trial."
The court's analysis of the statutory language established that defendants awaiting trial did not include those awaiting sentencing after a plea of guilty. Analysis of statutory language calls for strict
construction. See People v. Weidert, 39 Cal. 3d 836, 705 P.2d 380, 218
Cal. Rptr. 57 (1985); see also 22 CAL. JUR. 3D Criminal Law § 3371
(1986). Using strict statutory construction, the court found that a
trial was a proceeding at which guilt was determined and therefore,
"pending trial" referred to the period prior to the determination of
guilt. See also McMillon v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 3d 654, 204
Cal. Rptr. 52 (1984). In Overstreet, the appellant's plea was a determination of guilt and thus, the purpose of a trial was already attained. The period which could be considered pending trial ended
when the appellant pled guilty and did not extend to later sentenc-

ing. Therefore, another felony committed after the guilty plea was
entered would subject its perpetrator to a prison term based only on
the commission of the crime and would subject him to additional
punishment by way of enhancement under former section 12022.1.
The result in this case would have been different if the case had
arisen after the effective date of the 1985 amendment to former section 12022.1. It is likely the decision would have been in the reverse.
The decision in Overstreet is an example of the anomaly involved in
punishing through enhancement those defendants who were released
prior to trial and not those who were released after pleading guilty.
The result in this case argues for stricter standards for release of defendants on their own recognizance.
Perhaps the desire to prevent criminals from using their release as
an opportunity to commit additional offenses was the reason the legislature removed the words "pending trial" from the statute and replaced them with words of broader definition. However, since the
holding of this case is limited to unlitigated cases whose facts occurred prior to the 1985 amendments to former section 12022.1, the
impact of this decision on future cases will be minimal.
SARAH A. FUHRMAN
E. A judge may comment on the evidence afterjurors
announce that they are deadlocked as long as the
commentary does not effectively control the verdict. A
judge is required to make an independent determination
and state reasons therefor when ruling on an automatic
motion for modification of a death penalty verdict: People
v. Rodriguez.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In People v. Rodriguez,' Luis Valenzuela Rodriguez appealed his
conviction of two murders in the first degree and his sentence of
death. The appeal was based on allegations of prejudicial error committed by the trial court during three stages of the trial. First, the
appellant claimed that the trial court judge erred in the admission
and exclusion of certain evidence and jury instructions. The California Supreme Court rejected all eleven of Rodriguez's assignments of
prejudicial error at the evidentiary stage of his trial. Second, Rodri1. 42 Cal. 3d 730, 726 P.2d 113, 230 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1986). Justice Grodin wrote the
majority opinion with Justices Reynoso, Panelli, and Lucas concurring. Justice Mosk
wrote the separate dissenting opinion, with which Chief Justice Bird and Justice
Broussard concurred.
The advance sheets were modified in People v. Rodriguez, 42 Cal. 3d 1221a (1986).
This subsequent modification was the addition of a footnote.
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guez contended that the judge gave an unfair commentary on the evidence to the jury after the jurors announced that they had reached a
deadlock. The supreme court dismissed this claim and overruled People v. Cook,2 in which the court had held that post-deadlock judicial
commentary is per se unfair. Third, the appellant challenged several
aspects of the penalty phase. These challenges included, but were
not limited to, the constitutionality of the 1978 death penalty initiative3 and the failure of the judge to follow the letter of the death
penalty statute by omitting an independent determination on the
death penalty verdict. 4 The court upheld the constitutionality of the
death penalty statute, but vacated the death penalty judgment and
remanded to the trial court to make the determination.

II. THE EVIDENTIARY
A.

STAGE

FactualBackground
1.

The Prosecution's Case

The prosecution's chief witness was Margaret Klaess, with whom
Rodriguez had previously lived. Klaess was granted immunity for all
of the crimes that follow, with the exception of accessory after the
fact to the two murders.5 In November of 1978, Klaess and Rodriguez were arrested and Rodriguez's automobile was impounded.6 Intending to gather enough money to recover the impounded vehicle,
the pair, at gunpoint, stole the truck and the wallet of a person who
gave them a ride. 7 In Vallejo, California, Rodriguez assumed a false
name in order to obtain a temporary driver's permit.8 Acting under
the guise of test-driving, Rodriguez and Klaess pilfered two used
cars. 9 Then, Rodriguez utilized his gun to obtain some money from a
San Francisco resident.1o The pair proceeded to pick up a prostitute
and rob her of her jewelry and cash. 1
Klaess and Rodriguez left for Jeri Engel's home in Crockett, Cali2. 33 Cal. 3d 400, 658 P.2d 86, 189 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1983).
3. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West Supp. 1987).

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at § 190.4(e).
42 Cal. 3d at 747, 726 P.2d at 122, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 676.
Id. at 743, 726 P.2d at 119, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

fornia and purchased a pint of 151 proof rum.12 After their arrival,
Engel testified that he and Rodriguez went out to buy cocaine and
later shared it with Klaess. 13 Engel than testified that Rodriguez and
Klaess departed at 2:30 a.m. for Sacramento.14 Near Sacramento the
pair was stopped by police, apparently for speeding.15 Rodriguez
6
obeyed the police officer's request to step out of the automobile.1
Klaess heard gunshots and saw an officer lying on the ground.17
When Rodriguez returned to the car, he complained that he could
not locate "the license" or "the gun."18 He placed two silver revolvers in Klaess's purse. 19
Two witnesses set the time of the shootings at approximately 3:40
a.m. 20 Officer Blecher's and Officer Freeman's bodies were discovered by a deputy sheriff.2 1 Officer Blecher's backup .38 revolver and
a .22 revolver were found lying at the scene. 22 None of the three robbery victims positively identified the .22 as the gun Rodriguez used,
but none testified that it was definitely not the weapon. 23 The bullets that killed the officers appeared to have been fired from the police officers' highway patrol issued .38 revolvers which were never
2
located. 4
Klaess testified that the officers' revolvers were placed in a dumpster where the pair had stopped to ditch the car. 25 After they left the
car, they returned to their motel on foot down a muddy embankment. 26 Rodriguez's blood-stained and muddied "Lee" brand trousers
were found in their motel room. 27 A footprint of a "Famolare" brand
shoe that matched a pair of Rodriguez's, along with his forged tempo28
rary driver's license, were found at the crime scene.
A friend of Rodriguez, while in police custody himself, related that
Rodriguez bragged about the murders but refused to testify to the
same at trial.29 However, several witnesses did testify that Rodriguez
had stated that he hated the police and would kill any officers who
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 743, 726 P.2d at 119-20, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74.
at 743-44, 726 P.2d at 120, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
at 744, 726 P.2d at 120, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 674.

at 742, 726 P.2d at 119, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
at 743, 726 P.2d at 119, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 673.
at 745, 726 P.2d at 120, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
at 744, 726 P.2d at 120, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 674.

at 745, 726 P.2d at 121, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 675.
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attempted to arrest him.30 A prior girlfriend testified that she once
prevented Rodriguez from killing a police officer by stopping him
from reaching for a sawed-off shotgun when detained by an officer.31
2. The Defendant's Case
While Rodriguez admitted having committed the robberies and automobile thefts, he alleged that the gun used to effect them was
Klaess's .38 revolver. 32 He claimed that he did not recognize the .22
left at the murder scene.3 3 As to the night in question, Rodriguez
stated that he and Klaess left Engel's home at 1:30 a.m., instead of at
2:30 a.m. as Engel testified.34 According to Rodriguez, after nearly
reaching their Sacramento motel, Klaess wanted more cocaine and
took off in the car by herself.3 5 He returned to the motel and slept.36
In the morning, Rodriguez supposedly found Klaess's muddy pants in
37
the motel room.
Failing to have an explanation for the blood found on his "Lee"
brand jeans, Rodriguez denied having worn them on the day of the
murder.38 In addition, he owned "Famolare" brand shoes but also denied having worn them that day.39 Rodriguez claimed that Klaess's
motivation for lying flowed from the immunity from prosecution that
she was granted and from the mistaken receipt of a letter written by
Rodriguez to another girlfriend of his.40 Rodriguez alleged that it
was Klaess, not him, who hated the police.41
Rodriguez presented four witnesses who testified that a lightcolored car was located at the scene of the crime. 42 Klaess knew a
Robert Sanchez who drove a white Ford Galaxy. 43 However, more
than four witnesses stated that the vehicle parked near the patrol car
44
was completely different.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 745, 726 P.2d at 120, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
at 745, 726 P.2d at 120-21, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
at 746, 726 P.2d at 121, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 675.

at 747, 726 P.2d at 122, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 676.

at 747-48, 726 P.2d at 122, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 676.

B. Assignments of PrejudicialError
The court rejected the appellant's first allegation by holding that
the elimination of a juror on voir dire who could not reach a death
penalty verdict under any circumstances did not deprive him of a
representative jury.45 The court reasoned that the appellant's second
contention, that evidence of Klaess's prior drug use and psychiatric
treatment was improperly excluded, was without merit, since these
episodes occurred five to six years earlier. 46 The ruling by the trial
court that the particulars of Klaess's immunity agreement were inadmissible was appellant's third challenge. The supreme court recognized that the jury knew that the immunity applied to two murders,
three robberies, two kidnappings, and two car thefts; therefore, the
admission of the specific facts, especially where appellant was not
prepared to prove Klaess's involvement in the crimes, "would not
have added significantly to the already formidable attack on her
credibility." 47 The appellant's fourth contention was that the exclusion of cross-examination on the issue of Klaess's receipt of assistance
from the prosecutor in an unrelated criminal incident was prejudicial. Although the ruling unduly restricted the appellant, the
supreme court found that no prejudice resulted, since this unrelated
48
incident could not have added much to the general background.
The fifth assignment of error resulted from the exclusion of a
statement made by Robert Sanchez to his social worker. The Justices pointed out that, while the declaration that the .22 revolver
found at the murder scene belonged to Sanchez was admissible, no
prejudicial error was committed by preventing the social worker
from testifying to it. 4 9 As his sixth contention, appellant attempted
to invoke the best evidence rule 50 to obtain admission of an original
tape recording of Klaess's pretrial interview, instead of the transcript
of that interview in order to, show Klaess's "demeanor." 5 ' The
supreme court emphasized that the best evidence rule would not admit a tape recording over a transcript unless the transcript was alleged to be inaccurate. 52 Although the court agreed with appellant
45. Id. at 748, 726 P.2d at 122, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 676 (citing Lockhart v. McCree, 106
S. Ct. 1758, 1770 (1986); People v. Chavez, 39 Cal. 3d 823, 827, 705 P.2d 372, 375, 218 Cal.
Rptr. 49, 52 (1985)).
46. 42 Cal. 3d at 748-49, 726 P.2d at 123, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (citing CAL. EVID.
CODE § 352 (West 1966)).
47. 42 Cal. 3d at 750, 726 P.2d at 124, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 678.
48. Id. at 751-52, 726 P.2d at 125, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 679 (citing People v. Mardian, 47
Cal. App. 3d 16, 40-41, 121 Cal. Rptr. 269, 285 (1975)).
49. 42 Cal. 3d at 752, 726 P.2d at 125, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 679.
50. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1500 (West 1966 & Supp. 1987).
51. 42 Cal. 3d at 754, 726 P.2d at 126-27, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 680-81.
52. Id. at 754, 726 P.2d at 127, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 681 (citing People v. Fujita, 43 Cal.
App. 3d 454, 473, 117 Cal. Rptr. 757, 768 (1974)).
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on his seventh allegation that the trial court erroneously excluded
evidence of Klaess's drug connections in Sacramento, the court be3
lieved that the exclusion was not prejudicial.5
The basis for the appellant's eighth assignment of error was the
ruling that Klaess's reasons for hating the police were irrelevant.
The Justices observed that, since Klaess's involvement in the crimes
preceding the murders would have given her ample reasons to hate
the police, evidence of her prior experiences with them would only
serve to confuse the jury. 54 The ninth contention of appellant was
that the trial court improperly admitted testimony of several witnesses to the effect that Rodriguez hated the police and would kill
any officer who attempted to arrest him. The supreme court asserted
that a generic threat to kill any officer did not tend to show appellant's predisposition to commit crime as prohibited by section 1101 of
the Evidence Code,55 but rather his homicidal intent.5 6 On this same
evidence, the court held that the threats were not cumulative evidence, as intent to rob, steal, and kidnap is distinct from intent to
57
murder.
The appellant's tenth and eleventh challenges related to jury instructions. The appellant claimed that the jury should have been instructed that Klaess was an accomplice as a matter of law, instead of
allowing the jury to determine that Klaess was an accomplice.58 The
supreme court surmised that Klaess was not an accomplice as a matter of law because, although she hated the police, she never
threatened to kill police officers. 59 The refusal of the trial court to
give instructions on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter based
on diminished capacity was appellant's final assignment of error at
the pre-jury deliberation stage of the trial. The Justices concluded
60
that such instructions were not mandated by the evidence.
53. 42 Cal. 3d at 755, 726 P.2d at 127, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
54. Id. at 756, 726 P.2d at 128, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 682 (citing CAL. EVID. CODE § 352
(West 1966)).
55. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 1966 & Supp. 1987).
56. 42 Cal. 3d at 757, 726 P.2d at 129, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
57. Id. at 757-58, 726 P.2d at 129, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
58. Id. at 758, 726 P.2d at 130, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 684. The appellant urged that an
accomplice's testimony should be distrusted. Id. (citing CAL. JURY INSTRUCTIONS CRIM.
No. 3.18 (4th ed. 1979)).
59. 42 Cal. 3d at 761, 726 P.2d at 131, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 685.
60. Id. at 763, 726 P.2d at 133, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 687.

III.
A.

THE JURY DELIBERATION STAGE

Factual Background

After hearing evidence and instructions for fifty-six days, the jury
began deliberating.6 ' A juror became ill and was excused on the
sixth day of deliberation. However, an alternate juror was substituted. 62 After deliberating nine days, the jurors wrote a note to the
judge indicating that they could not reach a unanimous verdict.63 On
the tenth day, they resumed, reheard testimony, and again announced their deadlock. 64 The appellant moved for a mistrial which
was denied.65 Over the appellant's objection, the judge gave the jury
a supplemental charge commenting on certain testimony regarding
the color of the car seen driving on the highway at 2:00 a.m. the
morning of the murders. 66 The following day, the jury asked for and
was presented with a written copy of the supplemental charge, but
they later announced that they were still unable to agree. 67 The appellant once again moved for mistrial and the motion was denied.68
On the fifteenth day of deliberations, the court presented a second
supplemental jury charge regarding the "burden of proof, credibility
6' 9
of witnesses, and the duty of each juror to decide independently."
The next day, in response to a jury request, the jury was provided
with a third supplemental charge regarding the assessment of conflicting evidence. 70 The following day, the jury announced their
deadlock, and another of appellant's motions for mistrial was denied. 71 Thereafter, the court requested a vote division, which was
eleven to one on each of the five ballots taken.72 Finally, after nearly
five weeks of deliberations, the jury returned their verdict of guilty.73
B. Assignments of PrejudicialError
The appellant, relying on People v. Cook, 74 alleged that the giving
of the first supplemental charge was prejudicial error since it was
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 763, 726 P.2d at 133, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
Id. at 764, 726 P.2d at 133, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 687.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764, 726 P.2d at 134, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 764-65, 726 P.2d at 134, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
Id. at 765, 726 P.2d at 134, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
Id.
Id.
33 Cal. 3d 400, 658 P.2d 86, 189 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1983).
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given after the jury communicated that they were deadlocked. 75 The
Cook court held that post-deadlock judicial commentary was "'so
likely to invade the jury's province and control its verdict that such
comment must be deemed erroneous.'"76 The court in the present
case overruled the part of Cook that placed an absolute ban on such
commentary. 77 The court reviewed the history of the issue and specified that the California Constitution upheld the power of the trial
judge to comment on the evidence. 78 The Justices found that "the
right to [an] independent jury determination of facts does not mean
that a jury must be free from all judicial influence during its deliberations. '79 The court elucidated that the jury should be given the benefit of the judge's experience.8 0 In conclusion, the court ruled that
"the trial court has broad latitude in fair commentary, so long as it
81
does not effectively control the verdict."
The appellant alternatively contended that, if the commentary was
not per se prejudicial, the commentary was nonetheless improper because it was "distorted and biased in favor of the prosecution."8 2 He
alleged that the judge's statement to the jury that "you should keep
in mind all of the evidence bearing on the issues before you and not
necessarily single out any one piece of evidence,"83 was prejudicial
because the judge did not make clear that such a charge applied only
to the party upon whom the burden of proof rested.8 4 The supreme
court noted that the presence of the words "not necessarily" cured
any defect.8 5 The appellant also challenged the court's comments as
emphasizing the defects in a defense witness's testimony. Finding
that the trial court merely noted the inconsistencies of the evidence,
the court held that it would have been impossible for a judge to dis86
cuss all of the evidence related to a particular fact to be proved.
The appellant's final assignment of prejudicial error allegedly com75. 42 Cal. 3d at 765, 726 P.2d at 134, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 688. See generally 21 CAL.
Criminal Law §§ 2938-41 (1985); 23A C.J.S. CriminalLaw §§ 1375-80 (1961).
76. 33 Cal. 3d at 413, 658 P.2d at 94, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 167.
77. 42 Cal. 3d at 766, 726 P.2d at 135, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 689.
78. Id. (citing CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10).
79. 42 Cal. 3d at 768, 726 P.2d at 136, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 690.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 771, 726 P.2d at 138, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
83. Id. at 771 n.10, 726 P.2d at 138-39 n.10, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 693 n.10.
84. Id. at 772, 726 P.2d at 139, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 773, 726 P.2d at 140, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 694 (citing People v. Friend, 50 Cal.
2d 570, 578, 327 P.2d 97, 101 (1958)).
JUR. 3D

mitted at the jury deliberation stage was that his motion for mistrial
after the jury's fifth announcement of deadlock was improperly denied. The court rejected this contention by citing section 1140 of the
Penal Code87 which places the decision as to whether there existed a
"reasonable probability" that the jury may reach a verdict in the
hands of the trial judge.8 8 The appellant claimed that the court violated the rule set forth in People v. Crowley,8 9 by contending that the
judge impliedly gave an opinion that a verdict should be agreed upon
merely through continuing deliberations. 90 The court in the case at
hand refused to make such an implication. 91
C.

The Dissenting Opinion

The dissenting opinion took issue with only the jury deliberation
stage of the trial, specifically, the dissenters disagreed with the overruling of People v. Cook.92 Justice Mosk felt that the Cook rule protected the fundamental right to a trial by jury.93 The Justice noted
that, following a deadlock, a jury might have been easily swayed by a
trial judge. 94 Justice Mosk reviewed the doctrine of stare decisis and
concluded that the majority failed to show that the Cook decision was
"manifestly erroneous" as required by the doctrine. 95 The Justice declared that the United States Constitution's seventh amendment
guarantee of the right to a trial by jury overrode the California Constitution's amendment which provided judges with the power to comment.96 The dissenting Justices agreed with the appellant's
alternative contention that the comments themselves were
97
prejudicial.

IV. THE PENALTY STAGE
A.

FactualBackground

The appellant was sentenced to death. Because the murders were
committed in December of 1978 and the 1978 Death Penalty Initia87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1140 (West 1985).

88. 42 Cal. 3d at 775, 726 P.2d at 141, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (citing People v. Rojas,
15 Cal. 3d 540, 546, 542 P.2d 229, 232, 125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 360 (1975)). See generally 23A
C.J.S. CriminalLaw §§ 1381-86 (1961).
89. 101 Cal. App. 2d 71, 75, 224 P.2d 748, 751 (1950).
90. 42 Cal. 3d at 775, 726 P.2d at 141, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
91. Id. at 775, 726 P.2d at 142, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
92. 33 Cal. 3d 400, 658 P.2d 86, 189 Cal. Rptr. 159 (1983).
93. 42 Cal. 3d at 804, 726 P.2d at 161, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 715. See generally Comment, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 ME. L. REV. 167 (1985).
94. Id. at 805, 726 P.2d at 162, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
95. Id. at 806, 726 P.2d at 162, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 716.
96. Id. at 806, 726 P.2d at 163, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 717.
97. Id. at 807-08, 726 P.2d at 164, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
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tive98 was adopted in November of that year, the 1978 version of the
law was applied. 99 Under this statute, once a defendant was found
guilty of murder in the first degree with one or more special circumstances, the defendant became eligible for the death penalty. 10
o During a special penalty trial, the jury must weigh the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.1 0 1 If the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating, the death penalty must be imposed. If not,
2
the sentence was life imprisonment without parole.1o
B. Assignments of PrejudicialError
The appellant began by contending that the 1978 Death Penalty Initiative was unconstitutional because it lacked procedural safeguards.'0 3 The court demonstrated that the United States Supreme
Court has upheld both the 1977104 and the 1978105 California death

penalty statutes. 0 6 The appellant specifically challenged, as cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution, the use of a standard "knew or reasonably should have known" that the victim was a peace officer in determining the existence of the peace officer special circumstance. 0 7
The court stated that the constitutionality of such a test in proving a
special circumstance "must rest on the relationship between a defendant's criminal negligence with respect to knowledge of the officer's status and either retribution or deterrence or both."108 Noting
that the murdering of police officers resulted in a "special outrage"
because it endangers the entire population, the court concluded that
sentencing a defendant to death merely because he should have
98. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 190-190.5 (West Supp. 1987).
99. 42 Cal. 3d at 777, 726 P.2d at 143, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 697. This is significant in
that the 1978 law requires the imposition of the death penalty in certain situations,
whereas the 1977 statute merely permits such a sentence. Id. at 779, 726 P.2d at 144,
230 Cal. Rptr. at 698.
100. Id. at 777, 726 P.2d at 143, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 697 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.1(b) (West Supp. 1987)).
101. Id. at 777, 726 P.2d at 143, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 697 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2 (West Supp. 1987)).
102. Id. (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West Supp. 1987).
103. 42 Cal. 3d at 777, 726 P.2d at 143, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
104. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
105. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
106. 42 Cal. 3d at 778-79, 726 P.2d at 143, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 697.
107. Id. at 780, 726 P.2d at 145, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.2(a)(7) (West Supp. 1987)).
108. 42 Cal. 3d at 781, 726 P.2d at 145, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 699 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798 (1982)).

known that the victim was a peace officer would serve to punish as
well as deter.109 Thus, the court upheld the constitutionality of the
statute.
Even though the appellant's counsel at trial mistakenly approved
the use of an instruction regarding the weighing of mitigating and aggravating circumstances based upon the 1977 death penalty statute,
the appellant alleged that it was prejudicial error to give the 1977 instruction rather than the charge provided for in the 1978 law. 110 The
only significant difference between the two instructions was that the
1978 law requires the jurors to come to a conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating and then impose the
death penalty. By contrast, the 1977 statute merely implies that the
conclusion be reached.11 1 The court determined that such a mistake
did not amount to prejudicial error, since the jury would not reach
the death penalty verdict if they believed that the mitigating outweighed the aggravating circumstances. 112 The appellant then challenged the giving of the multiple-murder special circumstance twice.
While the Justices agreed that two multiple-murder charges might
have led the jury to believe that a defendant had committed four
murders, the court announced that, in this case, the jurors knew that
the appellant had been convicted of only two murders, so no preju3
dice could have resulted."l
The appellant's next three assignments were focused upon the
prosecutor's comments made during closing arguments. 114 Because a
defendant's chronological age and a defendant's moral justification
for committing the crime could only be considered as mitigating circumstances, the appellant claimed that the district attorney's two remarks, to the effect that "[h]e was old enough to know better" and
he did not produce "the slightest bit of moral justification," led the
jurors to believe that an older age and a lack of moral justification
were aggravating circumstances.1 15 The court disagreed that pointing
to the "inapplicability of a mitigating factor" resulted in the pro1 16
pounding of an aggravating circumstance.
The appellant's third contention of error with regard to the prose109. 42 Cal. 3d at 781-82, 726 P.2d at 146, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 700. See contra Green-

berg, Against The American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1670
(1986).
110. 42 Cal. 3d at 783, 726 P.2d at 147, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
ill. Id.
112. Id. at 784, 726 P.2d at 148, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 702 (citing People v. Easley, 34 Cal.
3d 858, 671 P.2d 813, 196 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1983)).
113. 42 Cal. 3d at 788, 726 P.2d at 150-51, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
114. In all three instances, the defense counsel failed to object. However, the court
went on to the merits of each contention. Id. at 788-91, 726 P.2d at 151-53, 230 Cal.
Rptr. at 705-07.
115. Id. at 788-90, 726 P.2d at 151-52, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 705-06.
116. Id. at 789-90, 726 P.2d at 151-52, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 705-706 (emphasis omitted).
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cution's commentary was the referral by the district attorney to the
testimony of a prior girlfriend of the appellant's given during the
guilt phase of the trial.n 7 The prosecutor's restatement of this testimony, providing that the appellant had reached for a sawed-off shotgun when detained by a police officer, was in violation of an
agreement made by the prosecutor. 1 8 Pursuant to this agreement, in
order to show the "other violent crimes" aggravating circumstance, i i 9
the district attorney was not to mention evidence related to crimes
other than the three robberies committed during the two days before
the murders.120 The court emphasized that once the defendant put
character in issue, the prosecution could rebut.121 The conclusion
reached was that the reference to the particular incident was merely
entered in rebuttal to appellant's evidence of good character and that
it was not entered to prove the aggravating circumstance. 22
The final challenge was the only assignment of error that the court
considered to be prejudicial. The appellant alleged that the trial
court failed to follow the letter of the statute by omitting to make an
independent determination and state the reasons therefor when ruling on the automatic motion for modification of the death penalty
verdict.123 Since the word "independent" from the phrase "independent determination" was omitted from the 1977 law when the 1978
statute was enacted, the trial judge felt that he could not make such
an independent decision.' 24 The Justices thought the change was not
intended by the legislature since the legislators provided for automatic review of a death sentence. 25 The court also agreed with the
appellant that the trial court had failed to sufficiently state the rea26
sons for the ruling.
V.

CONCLUSION

Allowing a judge to comment on the evidence in post-deadlock situations will enable the jurors to reach more informed decisions. The
117. Id. at 791, 726 P.2d at 152-53, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 706-07.
118. Id.
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3(b) (West Supp. 1987).
120. 42 Cal. 3d at 790-91, 726 P.2d at 152, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
121. Id. at 791, 726 P.2d at 153, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
122. Id. at 792, 726 P.2d at 153, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
123. Id. at 793, 726 P.2d at 154, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
124. Id. at 793, 726 P.2d at 154, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
125. Id. at 793-94, 726 P.2d at 155, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 708-09 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.4(e) (West Supp. 1987)).
126. 42 Cal. 3d at 794, 726 P.2d at 155, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 709.

jury will have the advantage of gaining insight from the judge's expertise. The danger that jurors may place too much emphasis on the
judge's commentary is minimal so long as the judge's remarks are
fair, accurate and unbiased. Requiring judges to make an independent determination and state reasons therefor when ruling on an automatic motion for modification of a death penalty verdict will insure
that appellate courts have access to a complete record of the penalty
phase proceedings. The presence of the judge's reasoning on such
factors as the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses will result in more effective appellate review. The system of
justice stands to gain through the exercise of the privilege to comment on the evidence and the independent judicial determination of
the applicability of the death penalty verdict.
LINDA M. SCHMIDT

F. Criminal defendants confined because they are
incompetent to stand trial are not allowed conduct and
participationcredits on their sentence for time served in
pretrialdetention: People v. Waterman.
In People v. Waterman, 42 Cal. 3d 565, 724 P.2d 482, 229 Cal. Rptr.
796, modified, 42 Cal. 3d 821(a), and the companion case of In re
Huffman, 42 Cal. 3d 552, 724 P.2d 475, 229 Cal. Rptr. 789, the
supreme court held that criminal defendants, confined for being incompetent to stand trial, or persons committed for treatment as mentally disordered sex offenders [hereinafter MDSO's], were not denied
equal protection of the law by being denied conduct and participation
credits against their sentence during the time spent in their respective detention programs. Although similar credits were allowed for
drug addicted offenders committed to the California Rehabilitation
Center [hereinafter CRC], the court upheld the constitutionality of
denying the credits.
Waterman was found incompetent to stand trial and was committed to the state hospital for treatment to restore him to competence
for trial pursuant to sections 1367 to 1370 of the Penal Code. Upon
being declared competent for trial, he pled guilty to two counts of assault with a deadly weapon on a police officer. He was sentenced to a
term of six years, less his actual time in pre-sentence confinement.
At a separate hearing, the defendant argued that in addition to credit
for time in pretrial confinement, he was entitled to conduct and participation credits on his sentence during his time in the hospital. He
premised his argument on the fact that CRC patients were allowed
such credits. The defendant also argued that sections 2930 to 2935 of
the Penal Code (defining conduct and participation credits) should
apply to his pre-trial confinement. The trial court, however, denied
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his claim. The court of appeal directed the trial court to modify the
sentence and grant the credits that the defendant sought.
The California Supreme Court found that the criminal incompetence statute (sections 1367 to 1370 of the Penal Code) did not expressly allow the conduct and participation credits sought by the
defendant as defined in sections 2930 to 2935 of the Penal Code. The
court followed its decision in In re Huffman and held that there was
no equal protection violation. The court concluded that there were
"substantial disparities between the treatment goals for incompetents
and CRC patients," and therefore, the credit distinctions drawn by
the legislature were amply supported to survive strict scrutiny. Waterman, 42 Cal. 3d at 569, 724 P.2d at 486, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 780.
Although the court noted that there were procedural similarities
between the CRC and the incompetent pretrial detention program,
the court determined that their purposes were different. For example, the CRC program provided post conviction rehabilitation, while
the program for incompetents provided pretrial detention. Therefore, the program for incompetents was not concerned with criminal
rehabilitation; rather, its purpose was to restore the defendant's
mental state in order to stand trial. Since the purpose of the program for incompetents was only to prepare a defendant to stand trial,
and not to be rehabilitated, the court found that the differences in
the credit systems were validly supported. Therefore, there was no
valid equal protection claim on that basis. Accordingly, the supreme
court reversed the court of appeal, and disallowed the defendant's
credits for conduct and participation during his pretrial confinement.
JAIME COULTER

Iv.

FAMILY LAW
The "changed circumstances" rule is only applicable in
child custody cases when there has been a priorjudicial
determinationof custody: Burchard v. Garay.

In Burchard v. Garay, 42 Cal. 3d 531, 724 P.2d 486, 229 Cal. Rptr.
800 (1986), the supreme court held that the "changed circumstances"
rule in child custody proceedings applies only when there has been a
prior judicial determination of custody. In the absence of a prior judicial determination, the applicable rule is the "best interests of the
child" test which is set forth in section 4600 of the Civil Code.
As a result of a brief liaison between the plaintiff, Ana Buchard,

and the defendant, William Garay, Sr., Ana became pregnant and
gave birth to a son on September 18, 1979. The defendant initially denied paternity and the plaintiff, with the help of her father and
others, supported and cared for the child.
The plaintiff brought paternity and support proceedings against the
defendant in the spring of 1980. The defendant stipulated to paternity and $200 a month support after court-ordered blood tests established that he was the father. In December of 1980, the parties
unsuccessfully attempted to live together as a family. Thereafter, the
defendant requested visitation rights. The plaintiff refused and filed
a petition for exclusive custody. Pending the outcome of the proceedings, the parties stipulated that Ana would retain custody and that
William would be entitled to two days visitation per week.
At the hearing, the plaintiff filed a motion asking the court to require the defendant to prove changed circumstances in order to justify a change in custody. The defendant opposed the motion arguing
that the sole criterion was the "best interests of the child."
The court deferred ruling on the motion. After hearing the evidence, the court issued a statement in which it implied that the
"changed circumstances" rule did not apply because there had not
been a prior de facto or de jure award of custody. The court applied
the "best interests" test of section 4600 of the Civil Code and awarded
custody to the defendant. Its decision was apparently based on the
defendant's superior financial ability and subsequent remarriage, and
upon the plaintiff's unwillingness to allow the defendant visitation
rights.
The defendant took custody on August 15, 1982, and the plaintiff
appealed and sought a writ of supersedeas. The court of appeal denied supersedeas and affirmed the trial court's order. The supreme
court granted review in August of 1984. The plaintiff did not seek supersedeas and the child remained in his father's custody pending the
appeal.
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's determination that
the "changed circumstances" rule did not apply in a case such as this.
In order for the "changed circumstances" rule to apply, there must
have been a prior judicial custody determination based upon circumstances existing at that time which established that the custody
award was in the best interests of the child. In the absence of a prior
judicial determination, "[t]he trial court has no alternative but to
look at all the circumstances bearing upon the best interests of the
child." Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 534, 724 P.2d at 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. at
802.
The "best interests" test, set forth in section 4600 of the Civil Code,
governs all child custody proceedings. The "changed circumstances"
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test is not different from the "best interests" test; rather, it is an auxiliary part of the "best interests" test. Once custody is awarded based
on the best interests of the child, that decision is not to be disturbed
"unless some significant change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in the child's best interest." 42 Cal. 3d
at 535, 724 P.2d at 488, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 802.
The "changed circumstances" rule recognizes the child's need for
stability and continuity and adheres to the principle of res judicata.
It operates to change the burden of persuasion and limits the evidence cognizable by the court. The noncustodial party has the burden of proving that a change of custody would be in the best interests
of the child, and the admissible evidence is limited to circumstances
arising after the judicial determination of custody is made.
The court rejected as unsound the use of the "changed circumstances" rule when there has not been a judicial determination of
custody but rather a de facto determination of custody. If the
"changed circumstances" rule was used in this type of situation, the
court would only be able to consider facts constituting changed circumstances and would have to disregard facts bearing on an initial
determination of the child's best interests. The potentially harmful
result of this application becomes apparent when considering a situation where the unsuitable parent retains custody, absent a judicial decree, and where the challenging parent in subsequent judicial
proceedings is required to prove changed circumstances since the onset of the initial custody. Although the circumstances may not have
changed, they were initially unsuitable. Pursuant to the "changed
circumstances" rule, however, the court would not be able to consider the initial unsuitable circumstances. It could only consider
those circumstances which changed since custody was established.
Thus, custody would remain with the unsuitable parent. The better
rule is to apply the "best interests" test in all custody proceedings,
subject to the application of the "changed circumstances" test, when
there has been a prior judicial custody decree and a subsequent
change is sought. This ensures that the best interests of the child
will have been considered and custody will be based on the determination thereof.
Although the trial court utilized the appropriate standard, the
supreme court held that it erred in its application and abused its discretion in awarding custody to the defendant. The trial court's first
basis of error was its reference to the defendant's economic advantage. Financial position is not a permissible basis upon which to

award custody since there is no correlation between wealth and quality parenting. "If in fact the custodial parent's income is insufficient
to provide proper care for the child, the remedy is to award child support, not to take away custody." Burchard, 42 Cal. 3d at 539, 724 P.2d
at 492, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
Another impermissible basis used by the trial court was that the
plaintiff had to leave the child in day care while she worked and
studied, while the defendant, who also worked, could leave the child
with his new wife. This alludes to the assumption that a working
mother cannot provide adequate care for her child. Not only is this
an unfair and unsupported assumption, but it "will in practice discriminate against women" who are less likely to remarry than divorced men. Id. at 540 n.10, 724 P.2d at 492 n.10, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 806
n.10.
The most significant factor leading to the supreme court's reversal
was that the plaintiff had been the primary caretaker of the child
from birth and the child was well-adjusted, well cared for, and
healthy. Moreover, there had been no proof that the plaintiff's care
had been seriously deficient. Stability and continuity in a child's life
are of overriding significance. The established modes of care should
not be disrupted except upon a showing that a change is in the best
interests of the child. There was an insufficient showing in this case
upon which to justify a change of custody. The court concluded that
the trial court abused its discretion and reversed the trial court's order awarding custody to the defendant.
The court concluded by reiterating its position that "in deciding the
issue of custody the court cannot base its decision upon the relative
economic position of the parties or upon any assumption that the care
afforded a child by single, working parents is inferior." Id. at 541, 724
P.2d at 493, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 807. See Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757 (1985); Atkinson,
Criteria for Deciding Child Custody in the Trial and Appellate
Courts, 18 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1984).
STEPHANIE FANOS
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V.

LABOR LAW
A.

The test to be applied to service-connected disability
retirement benefits for government employees is whether
or not there exists substantialevidence of a real and
measurable connection between the disability and the
employment: Bowen v. Board of Retirement.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bowen v. Board of Retirement,' the court held that the 1980
amendment to section 31720 of the Government Code2 did not alter
the test to be applied to service-connected disability retirement benefits for government employees. Rather, the court determined that the
amendment merely rejected the "infinitesimal contribution" test that
had developed in case law interpretations of the pre-amendment statute. Finally, the court construed the amendment's language requiring that the "employment contributes substantially to such
incapacity" 3 to mean that there must exist substantial evidence to
show a real and measurable connection between the disability and
the employment.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Thomas Bowen was employed by Los Angeles County from 1956 to
1977. For the first nineteen years he worked as a stenographer, and
for the last two he was an eligibility worker. In May of 1977, he was
involved in a nonemployment-related accident in which he suffered a
broken ankle. After this incident, Bowen failed to return to his occupation, claiming that the stress he experienced as an eligibility
worker was too great.
In August of 1978, Bowen attempted to obtain a service-connected
disability retirement. He was examined by three physicians who
found that no permanent disability had been suffered. Accordingly,
in September of 1979, his retirement application was denied. Two
months prior to this denial, Bowen experienced some permanent injury as a result of a heart attack. Armed with reports stating that
zero to fifty percent of his disability was derived from work-related
1. 42 Cal. 3d 572, 724 P.2d 500, 229 Cal. Rptr. 814 (1986). Justice Reynoso wrote
the majority opinion with which Justices Bird, Mosk, Broussard, and Grodin concurred. Justice Panelli separately concurred and dissented, and Justice Lucas
dissented.
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31720 (West Supp. 1987).
3. Id at § 31720(a).

causes, Bowen was granted a Retirement Board [hereinafter the
Board] hearing. The Board again denied the service-connected disa4
bility pension, instead granting nonservice-connected benefits.
Bowen challenged this decision by filing a petition for a peremptory
writ of mandate, which both the trial court and the court of appeal
denied.
III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Bowen argued two alternative positions: first, that the 1980 amendment to section 31720 of the Government Code should not be retroactively applied since he initially requested a service-connected pension
in 1978; and second, if the 1980 amendment was to be utilized, the
trial court erred in its application of the language of the amendment.
The court reasoned that because the 1980 amendment was enacted to
clarify existing law, Bowen's first contention need not be addressed.5
The court proceeded directly to Bowen's second argument.
A.

History of Section 31720 of the Government Code

The court began by discussing the history of section 31720 of the
Government Code. 6 Prior to the 1980 amendment, section 31720 provided that permanent disability pensions would be given only to
those persons whose "incapacity is a result of injury or disease arising
out of the course of his employment." 7 In Heaton v. Malin County
Employees Retirement Board,8 the appellate court dismissed the

Board's contention that section 31720 mandated that the employment
be the sole or substantial contributing cause of the disability. 9 The
Heaton court concluded that the language of the statute merely required that the disability be a result of the government employment,
not the result.1o

Subsequently, other courts relying on the Heaton decision, reasoned that Heaton stood for the proposition that a disability infinitesimally related to employment would result in eligibility for a serviceconnected disability pension.'" Fearing for the solvency of their re4. Higher payments are yielded from a service-connected pension.
5. 42 Cal. 3d at 575 n.3, 724 P.2d at 502 n.3, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 816 n.3. The court
pointed out, " 'An exception to the general rule that statutes are not construed to apply retroactively arises when the legislation merely clarifies existing law.'" Id, (citing
Martin v. California Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 18 Cal. 2d 478, 484, 116 P.2d 71, 74
(1941)).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31720 (West Supp. 1987).
7. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31720(a) (West 1968). See generally 49 CAL. JUR. 3D Pensions & Retirement Systems §§ 4-40 (1979 & Supp. 1986).
8. 63 Cal. App. 3d 421, 133 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1976).
9. Id. at 425-26, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 811.
10. Id-at 428-29, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 812-13.
11. 42 Cal. 3d at 576, 724 P.2d at 502, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (citing Van Hook v.
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tirement plans, many county governments demanded a legislative
change. 12 The court noted that the Senate specifically recognized the
problems with the Heaton interpretation and, via the 1980 amendment, was attempting to establish a higher standard. 13 The Senate
had proposed a "principal result" test. 14 However, the Assembly reformed this to the "substantial contribution" standard 15 that was
enacted.
B. Interpretationof the 1980 Amendment
Bowen believed that the tort concept of legal causation should have
been employed in interpreting the "substantial contribution" requirement of the amended statute.16 The court rejected this contention,
finding that the utilization of tort law would have been potentially
confusing. 17 The Board suggested that the statutory addition established a greater than fifty-percent standard.1S The Justices insisted
that such an interpretation would have served to circumvent the purpose of section 31720.19 The court stressed that pension funds were
established in recognition of a public obligation to disabled public servants.20 In keeping with the underlying purpose of pension legislation, the court maintained that such statutes must be liberally
2
construed. 1
The Justices surmised that, since the legislature merely intended
to reject Heaton and its progeny, case law prior to the 1980 amendment's enactment could be relied upon.22 The court invoked the test
Board of Retirement, 148 Cal. App. 3d 714, 716 n.1, 196 Cal. Rptr. 186, 187-88 n.1 (1983);
DePuy v. Board of Retirement, 87 Cal. App. 3d 392, 396, 150 Cal. Rptr. 791, 793-94
(1978)).
12. 42 Cal. 3d at 576, 724 P.2d at 502, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (citing S. 1076, Assem.
File Analysis (June 5, 1980)).
13. 42 Cal. 3d at 576, 724 P.2d at 502, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (citing Senate Comm. on
Public Employment and Retirement (May 14, 1979)).
14. 42 Cal. 3d at 576, 724 P.2d at 502, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 816 (citing S. 1076, Reg. Sess.
§ 1 (1979-1980)).
15. 42 Cal. 3d at 576, 724 P.2d at 503, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
16. Id at 578 n.4, 724 P.2d at 503 n.4, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 817 n.4. The tort causation
approach was utilized in Lundak v. Board of Retirement, 142 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 191
Cal. Rptr. 446 (1983).
17. 42 Cal. 3d at 578 n.4, 724 P.2d at 503 n.4, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 817 n.4.
18. Id. at 577, 724 P.2d at 503, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 817.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 31451 (West 1968)). See generally 60 AM. JUR. 2D
Pension & Retirement Funds, §§ 39-72 (1972 & Supp. 1986).
21. 42 Cal. 3d at 577, 724 P.2d at 503, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 817 (citing Cordell v. City of
Los Angeles, 67 Cal. App. 2d 257, 266, 154 P.2d 31, 36 (1944)).
22. 42 Cal. 3d at 577-78, 724 P.2d at 503, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 817.

employed in DePuy v. Board of Retirement.23 The appellate court in
DePuy held that "while the causal connection between the [job]
stress and the disability may be a small part of the causal factors, it
must nevertheless be real and measurable. There must be substantial evidence of some connection between the disability and the
job."24 Thus, the court in the case at bar concluded that the "substantial contribution" language of section 31720 required "substantial
evidence of a 'real and measurable' connection between the disability
and employment."2 5
IV.
A.

THE SEPARATE OPINIONS

Justice Panelli's Concurringand Dissenting Opinion

Justice Panelli concurred with the majority's holding that the 1980
amendment to section 31720 of the Government Code merely explained, and did not alter, the statute. 26 The Justice parted company
with the majority on the interpretation of the amendment. Justice
Panelli advocated the tort causation test adopted in Lundak v. Board
of Retirement.27 The appellate court in Lundak held that the Restatement Second of Torts28 should be applied to the 1980 amendment. 29 The Lundak decision yielded a "substantial factor" test.30 In
applying this standard, Justice Panelli explained that "the employment-related injury or illness must be a material element and have
contributed to the disability in such a manner that reasonableminds
would find the employment-related condition was in some way responsible for the disability." 31 Finally, the Justice emphasized that
tort causation theories were already operating in the areas of workers' compensation and employee disability and were not causing any
32
confusion as the majority indicated.
23. 87 Cal. App. 3d 392, 150 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1978). See also Annotation, Determination Whether Peace Officer's Disability Is Service-Connected for Disability Pension
Purposes: DePuy v. Board of Retirement, 12 A.L.R. 4TH 1150 (1982).
24. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 399, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
25. 42 Cal. 3d at 578, 724 P.2d at 504, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 818. See generally 70 C.J.S.
Pensions § 7 (1951). The court reversed the court of appeal's decision and remanded to
the trial court.
26. 42 Cal. 3d at 579, 724 P.2d at 504, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 818 (Panelli, J., concurring
and dissenting).
27. 142 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 191 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1983).
28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965).
29. 142 Cal. App. 3d at 1045, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
30. Id. at 1045-46, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 449.
31. 42 Cal. 3d at 580, 724 P.2d at 505, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (Panelli, J., concurring
and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
32. Id.
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B. Justice Lucas' Dissenting Opinion
Justice Lucas began by rejecting the majority's invocation of the
DePuy analysis because DePuy was decided prior to the 1980 amendment to section 31720 of the Government Code.33 Justice Lucas
noted that the DePuy court's holding was merely an attempt to moderate the "infinitesimal contribution" standard.34 The Justice felt
that the Legislature's purpose in enacting the amendment was to effect a substantive change in the law. 35 In reviewing the history of
the amendment, Justice Lucas found that the bill in its final form
represented a compromise between county governments and labor.36
Thus, the conclusion to be gleaned was that a "new quantitative measure" was intended, as evidenced by the adoption of completely new
language. 37 In fact, the Legislature pronounced its intent to change
the statute substantively by stating that the "substantial contribution
test 'shall be applicable to all applicants for disability retirement on
38
or after the effective date' of the amendment."
The Justice then focused upon the possible interpretations of the
amendment. Justice Lucas rejected the Lundak tort causation test as
proposed by Bowen and Justice Panelli's separate opinion. 39 Justice
Lucas reduced the Lundak standard to a requirement that the work
be "a cause" of the disability, which merely reflected the preamended statute. 40 The Justice examined the plain meaning of the
words "contributes substantially."41 He believed that "contributes
substantially" meant that the "employment must contribute more
than ten percent to a disability in order to qualify for a service-connected disability retirement under the 1980 amendment." 42 Justice
Lucas concluded that a "greater than ten percent" test would hold intact the viability of county retirement plans. 43
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id
Id
Id.
Id
Id
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

581, 724 P.2d at 506, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
583, 724 P.2d at 507-08, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 821-22 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
582, 724 P.2d at 506, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
584, 724 P.2d at 508, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
584-85, 724 P.2d at 508, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 822 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
585, 724 P.2d at 509, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 823 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
586, 724 P.2d at 509, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 823 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
587, 724 P.2d at 510, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (Lucas, J., dissenting) (empha-

sis in original).
41. Id. (Lucas, J., dissenting).
42. Id,at 587-88, 724 P.2d at 510, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (Lucas, J., dissenting).
43. Id at 588, 724 P.2d at 511, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 825 (Lucas, J., dissenting).

V.

CONCLUSION

The interpretation of the 1980 amendment to section 31720 of the
Government Code producing a "substantial evidence of a real and
measurable connection between the disability and the employment"
requirement can hardly be said to allay the fears of the county governments who moved for the amendment. All occupations, from
those with little responsibility to those with great responsibility, involve stress. In other words, stress is a natural result of being employed in our modern world. To allow those persons who are illequipped to deal with job-related stress to gain the benefits of a full
work-related disability pension via such a low standard of proof, is to
place too little meaning on the phrase "work-related disability." The
threat to the viability of county pension funds is real under this standard, and one can only hope that the money will be available to those
who are truly deserving. A ten percent or greater standard, instead
of an elusive "real and measurable connection" (one percent is real
and measurable) requirement, would better serve the interests of
those persons relying on the pension plans of their government
employers.
LINDA M. SCHMIDT

B. A public employees' strike is not a prima facie tort for
which damages can be recovered: City of San Francisco v.
United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 38.
In City of San Franciscov. United Association of Journeymen and
Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 38, 42
Cal. 3d 810, 726 P.2d 538, 230 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1986) [hereinafter Local
38], the supreme court decided the question reserved in County Sanitation DistrictNo. 2 v. Los Angeles County Employees Association, 38
Cal. 3d 564, 699 P.2d 835, 214 Cal. Rptr. 424, cert. denied, 106 S. Ct.
408 (1985). In holding that a public employer cannot recover damages under a prima facie tort theory as a result of a public employees'
strike, the court overturned Pasadena Unified School District v.
PasadenaFederationof Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr.
41 (1977).
In the action that preceded Local 38, the trial court granted a preliminary injunction against the striking unions. The court of appeal
declared that the strike was illegal, despite the fact that the strike
did not involve or incite violence. City of San Francisco v.
Evankovich, 69 Cal. App. 3d 41, 137 Cal. Rptr. 883 (1977). Prior to
the appellate decision, San Francisco filed for tort damages sustained
by the city during the strike which instituted this cause of action.
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The trial court awarded damages in excess of four million dollars
to the city. Before the court of appeal decided Local 38, the supreme
court decided County Sanitation, which permitted public employee
strikes, except those that posed an imminent threat to public health
or safety. The court declared that the union was collaterally estopped by the earlier Evankovich decision from challenging the ruling as to the illegality of the strike.
The supreme court reversed the decision of the court of appeal
with respect to the availability of damages as a remedy for an illegal
strike, reserving the employers' right to sue for damages for breach
of an explicit no-strike clause and for tortious acts occurring during
the strike. The court reasoned that decisions affecting labor law
were more appropriately decided by the legislature. Further, the
court urged that a judicial remedy of tort damages would not be appropriate in many cases since an administrative provision provided
for resolving most public employer-employee conflicts.
The court's reticence is odd considering its willingness in 1985 to
abolish the long-standing labor relations rule which declared that in
the absence of legislation, public employees in general do not have
the right to strike. See 51A C.J.S. Labor Relations § 306 (1967).
RHONDA SCHMIDT

C. Amended legislation affecting an employee's substantive
rights will be given retroactive effect when the statutory
provision operates to clarify existing law, ratherthan to

change it: Hoffman v. Board of Retirement.
In Hoffman v. Board of Retirement, 42 Cal. 3d 590, 724 P.2d 511,

229 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1986), the court considered the 1980 amendment
of section 31720 of the California Government Code and its effect on
a Los Angeles County employee's request for service-connected disability retirement. Hoffman worked in a clerical position for four
years until July, 1976, when she suffered what she believed to be a
stroke. Subsequent medical examination was inconclusive: some reports found her employment to have significantly aggravated her hypertension and anxiety, while other reports attributed her disability
to nonindustrial causes. Hoffman's prior medical history revealed
similar symptoms and illnesses antedating her county employment.
The Board of Retirement of the Los Angeles County Employees' Retirement Association awarded Hoffman a disability pension on November 5, 1980. They concluded, however, that her disability was not

service related, thereby lowering her benefits. The application for,
and award of, the pension was made prior to the effective date of the
amendment. Her writ petition to the superior court was heard following the effective date of the legislation in question.
The superior court applied the substantial contribution test of the
amended statute, a higher standard than the original provision, and
held that the burden had not been satisfied as to warrant a serviceconnected pension. Following the general rule presented in Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co. v. IndustrialAccident Commission, 30 Cal.
2d 388, 182 P.2d 159 (1947), the court of appeal held that the amended
statute should not in retrospect be applied to Hoffman. Aetna specified that statutes affecting the substantive rights of employees operate prospectively. The appellate court further held that the creation
of a stricter standard of proof was a substantive change in the law.
Since the legislature did not expressly provide for the retroactivity of
the amendment, the case was remanded to the superior court to apply the proper test of causation.
The supreme court agreed in principle with the rationale of the
lower court, citing the rule of DiGenova v. State Board of Education,
57 Cal. 2d 167, 367 P.2d 865, 18 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1962), that a statute
affecting a substantive right will not be given retroactive effect without an express declaration of legislative intent for such. However,
the court, in harmony with the decision given in the companion case
of Bowen v. Board of Retirement, 42 Cal. 3d 572, 724 P.2d 500, 229 Cal.
Rptr. 814 (1986), found an exception to the rule by holding the
amended statute to be a clarification, rather than a substitution, of
existing law. By determining that the inclusion of the substantial
contribution test merely serves to emphasize the necessity of a measurable, causal connection between the employment and the disability of the employee, the court was able to bring Hoffman under the
scope of Martin v. California Mutual Building and Loan Association, 18 Cal. 2d 478, 116 P.2d 71 (1941), which allowed the retroactive
application of an amended law which was not altered, but simply
clarified by amendment.
Accordingly, the decision of the court of appeal was reversed, and
the action remanded to the superior court for resolution consistent
with the amended standard of causation expressed in this opinion
and in Bowen.
TRAVIS P. CLARDY
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VI. PUBLIC RECORDS
Applications and licenses authorizing the possession of
concealed weapons must be disclosed upon request under
the Public Records Act: CBS, Inc. v. Block.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 6255 of the Government Code' allows exemption from disclosure under the Public Records Act2 when "[t]he agency demonstrat[es]... that on the facts of the particular case the public interest
served by not making the record public clearly outweighs the public
4
interest served by disclosure of the record."3 In CBS, Inc. v. Block,
the court held that the defendants had failed to satisfy this burden
when they invoked section 6255 to deny a request for disclosure of
applications and licenses approved by the sheriff which authorized
the possession of concealed weapons.5 The court reasoned that without access to the applications the public would have no means by
which to ascertain whether the county official was exercising his dis6
cretion properly.

II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In July of 1983, the plaintiff was denied a request to have access to
the applications and licenses approved by the county sheriff authorizing individuals to carry concealed weapons. The plaintiff sought the
records to aid the production of a report about possible abuses of discretion by the county sheriff in issuing licenses for concealed weapons. Only thirty-three licenses had been issued in Los Angeles
County by the sheriff, all of which were for renewals.
In response to the sheriff's refusal to produce the applications or
licenses, CBS filed a motion for disclosure, relying on sections 6258
and 6259 of the Government Code.7 The trial court reviewed the ap1.

CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West 1980) [hereinafter section 6255].

2. Id §§ 6250-6267 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter the Act].
3. Id § 6255 (West 1980).
4. 42 Cal. 3d 646, 725 P.2d 470, 230 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1986). Chief Justice Bird wrote
for the majority with Justices Broussard, Reynoso, Grodin, and McClosky concurring.
Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion in which Justice Panelli concurred.
5. I& at 656, 725 P.2d at 477, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
6. IM at 656-57, 725 P.2d at 477, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
7. Id Section 6258 of the Government Code authorizes proceedings to enforce
one's right to inspect public records. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6258 (West 1980). Section
6259 of the Government Code provides in part: "[w]henever it is made to appear by
verified petition to the superior court ...that certain public records are being improp-

plications and licenses in cameras and ordered disclosure of most of
the licenses.9 However, residential addresses of the licensees were
not included, nor was CBS allowed to make copies of the applications.1o Both the plaintiff and the defendants appealed the
judgment."

III. THE MAJORITY OPINION
A.

The Public Records Act

In section 6250 of the Government Code, the legislature provided:
"In enacting this chapter [the Public Records Act2], the Legislature,
mindful of the rights of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that
access to information concerning the conduct of the people's business
is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state."' 3
The purpose of the Act was to minimize secrecy in government1 4 as
well as to "increas[e] freedom of information." 15 Moreover, the court
in CBS held that access to public records enabled the community to

keep checks on government officials and guard against abuse of their
powers.

16

Section 6254 of the Government Codel7 set out a number of specific
exceptions to the Act. The court noted that the agency was free to
exercise its discretion in deciding whether or not to apply these ex8
ceptions.' The agency was free to disclose the information when the
public's interest in disclosure outweighed the interest sought to be
erly withheld... the court shall order the officer... to disclose the public record or
show cause why he should not do so." Id. § 6259 (West 1980).
8. To determine whether records are excluded under the exceptions to the Public
Records Act, the court may view the records in camera. See generally Register Div. of
Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. County of Orange, 158 Cal. App. 3d 893, 205 Cal. Rptr. 92
(1984).
9. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d at 649, 725 P.2d at 472, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6267 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
13. Id. § 6250 (West 1980). See generally Mink, The Mink Case: Restoring the
Freedom of Information Act, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 8 (1974); 55 CAL. JUR. 3D Records
and Recording Laws § 7 (1980).
14. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d at 651, 725 P.2d at 473, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (quoting San
Gabriel Tribune v. Superior Court, 143 Cal. App. 3d 762, 771-72, 192 Cal. Rptr. 415, 420
(1983)). See also ACLU v. Deukmejian, 32 Cal. 3d 440, 651 P.2d 822, 186 Cal. Rptr. 235
(1982).
15. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d at 651, 725 P.2d at 473, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (quoting Los Angeles Police Dept. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. App. 3d 661, 668, 135 Cal. Rptr. 575, 579
(1977)).
16. Id.
17. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West 1980) [hereinafter section 6254]. See generally
Special Project, A Look At the California Records Act and its Exemptions, 4 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 203 (1974).
18. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d 652, 725 P.2d at 473-74, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66.
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protected by nondisclosure.19 In the instant case, the defendants
failed to claim the records fit under any express exception in section
6254. Instead, they claimed privilege under the "catch-all" exception
20
to the Act, which employed a balancing test of competing interests.
B.

The Balancing Test

Section 6255 provided that where a public agency was not exempted from disclosing its records under an express exception to the
Public Records Act, it could withhold records by demonstrating that
the public interest in not disclosing the records "clearly outweigh[ed]" the public interest in disclosure. 21 The court stated that
the standard to apply to the balancing test was that of independent
review. 22 Thus, the court independently reviewed the lower court's
23
balancing analysis.
The defendants contended that disclosure would render licensed
concealed weapon holders more vulnerable to attack. 24 The court
reasoned that the knowledge that these persons were armed would
allow criminals to plan their crimes more carefully.2 5 The defendants argued that persons in need of concealed weapons for personal
protection might refrain from acquiring them if personal identities
6
were to be disclosed.2
The court believed the defendants' arguments were "conjectural at
best."27 In rebuttal to the defendants' claims, the court suggested
that a would-be attacker's knowledge of the weapons may actually
19. Id
20. d 42 Cal. 3d at 652, 725 P.2d at 474, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
21. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6255 (West 1980). See generally Eskaton Monterey Hosp. v.
Myers, 134 Cal. App. 3d 788, 184 Cal. Rptr. 840. In Monterey, hospital Medi-Cal program services were audited. The California Appellate Court found that the public interest in not disclosing the records clearly outweighed the public's interest in
disclosure because disclosure would reveal the hospital's strategy for audits of MediCal recipients. The balancing test is a public policy approach. See Pantos v. County of
San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 3d 258, 198 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1984). Furthermore, "[w]here
there is no contrary statute or public policy, the right to inspect public records must be
freely allowed." Id at 261, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 492.
22. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d at 650, 725 P.2d at 472, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
23. Id. at 651, 725 P.2d at 472-73, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
24. Id at 652, 725 P.2d at 474, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
25. Id. at 652, 725 P.2d at 474, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 366. Justice Mosk, in his dissenting
opinion, speculated even further that since the would-be attackers would have knowledge of the concealed weapons, an attack on a weapon holder may be more enticing as
an exciting challenge. Id. at 663, 725 P.2d at 481, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 373 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).
26. Id at 653, 725 P.2d at 474, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
27. Id at 652, 725 P.2d at 474, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 366.

serve to discourage such crimes.28 Moreover, the court reasoned that

under section 6257 of the Government Code,29 the portions which
might aid criminals in planning an attack could be deleted prior to
disclosure.3 0
The court concluded that the public's interest in reviewing the government's business outweighed the licensees' rights to remain anonymous, 3 1 noting that, "[t]he interest of society in ensuring
accountability is particularly strong where the discretion invested in
a government official is unfettered, and [the official grants to] ...
only a select few the special privilege." 32 The court emphasized that
in order to ascertain whether the sheriff was abusing his discretionary powers, it was imperative that the public have access to review
the approved applications.3 3 Therefore, the court remanded the case
to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the
opinion. 34
IV.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Mosk wrote a separate dissenting opinion. The Justice
claimed the license holders' constitutional right to privacy would be
violated by public disclosure of the applications.3 5 He reiterated the
defendants' contention that disclosure would expose the licensed
weapon holders to increased risk of attack.3 6 Justice Mosk believed
that CBS's interest in obtaining the application was "minimal if not
nonexistent." 37 However, he did not refute the majority's claim of
the importance of checks on governmental power. Finally, the Jus28. Id. at 652 n.9, 725 P.2d at 474 n.9, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 366 n.9.
29. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6257 (West 1980). "Any reasonably segregable portion of a
record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of portions which are exempt by law." 1d.
30. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d at 652-53, 725 P.2d at 474, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
31. Id. at 656, 725 P.2d at 477, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 369.

32. Id. at 655, 725 P.2d at 475-76, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
33. Id. at 657, 725 P.2d at 477, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 369. Section 12050 of the Penal
Code provides in pertinent part: "[t]he sheriff of a county... upon proof that the person applying is of good moral character, [and] that good cause exists for the issuance
...may issue to such a person a license to carry a concealed... firearm." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 12050 (West 1977).
34. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d at 657, 725 P.2d at 477, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 369.
35. Id. at 666, 725 P.2d at 483, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 375 (Mosk, J., dissenting). Article I
section 1 of the California Constitution provides: "[a]ll people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life
and liberty, acquiring and possessing and protecting property, and pursuing ...privacy." CAL. CONST., art. I, § 1 (emphasis added). But see Braun v. City of Taft, 154
Cal. App. 3d 332, 201 Cal. Rptr. 654 (1984) (disclosure of certain material from a city
employee's file was deemed not to be an unwarranted invasion of privacy). See gener.
ally Comment, InformationalPrivacy and PublicRecords, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977).
36. CBS, 42 Cal. 3d at 664, 725 P.2d at 481, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).

37. Id. at 665, 725 P.2d at 482, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 374 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
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tice proclaimed that since the Legislature gave the sheriff unfettered
discretion, "[i]f that discretion is to be curtailed, the legislature is the
body to do it."38
V.

CONCLUSION

The majority opinion emphasized the public policy underlying the
Public Records Act. Access to governmental records and files is imperative to review public officials' conduct. Without public access to
the applications for concealed weapons licenses, a sheriff could exercise his power unchecked by the community. Although the licensed
weapon holders may have a privacy interest, this interest is sufficiently outweighed by the public's interest in reviewing the sheriff's
conduct. Moreover, the opinion pointed out that any information detrimental to the licensees' safety could be segregated from the non-injurious portions of the records. Therefore, the defendants' argument
that the license holders would be harmed by the disclosure loses
much of its force. The opinion made clear that the Public Records
Act will not be easily disregarded by the courts.
MARIANNE CHIAPUZIO

VII.

TORT LAW
A. A condominium homeowners association may be held to a
landlord's standardof carefor the common areas under
its control: Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Association.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The supreme court greatly expanded the duty and possible liability
of condominium associations in Frances T v. Village Green Owner's
Association.' In reversing the trial court's judgment, the court held
that a condominium association should be held to the same standard
of care as that of a landlord.2 That is, a condominium association is
responsible for the common areas under its control. Therefore, the
38. Id. at 665, 725 P.2d at 482-83, 230 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75 (Mosk, J., dissenting).
1. 42 Cal. 3d 490, 723 P.2d 573, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1986). The majority opinion
was authored by Justice Broussard, with Chief Justice Bird and Justices Reynoso and
Grodin concurring. Chief Justice Bird wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice
Mosk wrote a concurring and dissenting opinion in which Justice Lucas concurred.
2. For an overview of a condominium association's liability for injuries caused by
the condition of the premises see Annotation, Liability of Condominium Association
or CorporationFor Injury Allegedly Caused By Condition of Premises, 45 A.L.R. 3D
1171 (1972). For a discussion of the tort liability of condominium associations in Cali-

court held that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for negligence against both the homeowner's association (a corporation) and
the individual members of its board of directors. However, plaintiff
failed to state a cause of action for breach of contract and breach of
fiduciary duty, and those counts were properly dismissed.
II. BACKGROUND
The plaintiff sued the Village Green Owner's Association, 3 and individual members of its board of directors, 4 for injuries sustained
when she was attacked in her condominium unit, a part of the Village Green Condominium Project.5 On the night of October 8, 1980,
an unidentified person entered plaintiff's condominium after dark
and raped and robbed her. At the time of the break-in, the condominium had absolutely no exterior lighting.
The project consisted of 92 buildings situated in park-like "courts."
Each building contained several condominiums. The plaintiff's unit
faced the largest of the courts, which she alleged were poorly lit,
with her court being the poorest lit of all.6
Throughout 1980, project residents were the victims of numerous
crimes, including car theft, burglary and robbery. All of the projects'
residents, including the board of directors, were aware of the high incidents of crime, largely due to articles about the crime wave published in the Association's newsletter. 7 The newsletter contained
complaints by residents about the lighting, and one edition included a
call for all ground floor residents to leave their exterior lights burning "as a civic duty."s In early 1980, the board of directors began to
investigate the lighting problems.
fornia before Village Green, see 12 CAL. JUR. 3D Condominiums and Cooperative
Apartments § 16 (1974 & Supp. 1986).
3. "The association is a nonprofit corporation, rather than an unincorporated association." 42 Cal. 3d at 495 n.1, 723 P.2d at 574 n.1, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 457 n.1.
4. The board of directors is made up of individual condominium unit owners. Id.
at 519, 723 P.2d at 591, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 474 (Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting).
5. The Village Green Owners' Association, through the board of directors, conducts, manages and controls the affairs of the project. It is also responsible for the
management of the project and the maintenance of its common areas. Id. at 496, 723
P.2d at 575, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
6. Id.
7. "From January through July 1980, articles about the crime wave and possible
protective measures were published in the Association's newsletter and distributed to
the residents of the Project, including the directors." Frances T, 42 Cal. 3d at 496, 723
P.2d at 575, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
8. "The newsletters included such items as: 'LIGHTS! LIGHTS! LIGHTS! You are
doing a disservice to your neighbors as well as yourself if you keep your front and back
doors in darkness. Many who live upstairs are able to gaze out on the green at night
and see perfectly the presence or absence of a prowler where there is a lighted doorway. But where porches are shrouded in darkness, NOTHING is visible. As A CIVIC
DUTY-WON'T You KEEP THOSE LIGHTS ON?'" Id. at 497 n.3, 723 P.2d at 575 n.3, 229
Cal. Rptr. at 458 n.3.
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The plaintiff's unit was first burglarized in April 1980. She blamed
the incident on the poor lighting and caused an item relating these
sentiments to be published in the newsletter. 9 Furthermore, the
plaintiff, in her capacity as a "court representative," transmitted a
formal request to the board that more lighting be installed in her
court as soon as possible.'o
The plaintiff submitted another request in August of 1980 because
the board had failed to act on previous requests. When the board still
had not taken action by late August, the plaintiff installed additional
exterior lighting herself. However, in a letter dated August 29, 1980,
the project manager requested that plaintiff remove the lighting."
On October 1 the plaintiff appeared at a board of directors meeting
where she requested permission to maintain her lighting until the
board improved the lighting situation. The board denied the request
and informed the plaintiff by letter that she was to remove the lighting or it would be removed and she would be billed for the cost. 12
The site manager informed the plaintiff that she could not use the
lights pending their removal. Because the additional lighting was
wired into the same circuitry as the original exterior lights and used
the same switch, the plaintiff was, in effect, required to do without
any exterior lighting. As a result, the plaintiff's condominium was in
9. The plaintiff caused the following item to be printed in the association's newsletter: "With reference to other lighting, Fran [T.] of Ct 4, whose home was entered,
feels certain (and asked that this be mentioned) that the break-in would not have occurred if there had been adequate lighting at the end of her Court." Id. at 497, 723
P.2d at 575, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
10. In May 1980, the residents of plaintiff's court met and drafted a formal request
that more lighting be installed as soon as possible. The plaintiff transmitted the following report to the project's manager with a copy to the board. It stated:
June 12, 1980. REPORT FROM YOUR COURT REP.... It was requested that
the following items be relayed to the on-site mgr. for consideration and action
if possible.
1. Lights be installed on the northeast corner of bldg. 18 promptly.
Item No. 1 above was put into the form of a motion with the request that
action be taken on this item particularly by the site manager ....
Frances T., 42 Cal. 3d at 497 n.5, 723 P.2d at 575 n.5, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 458 n.5.
11. "ITihe site manager told plaintiff that she would have to remove the lighting
because it violated the CC&R's," the project's declaration of covenants, conditions and
restrictions. Id. at 498, 723 P.2d at 576, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
12. The letter stated in part:
The Board resolved as follows:
You are requested to remove the exterior lighting you added to your front
door and in your patio and to restore the Association Property to its original
condition on or before October 6. If this is not done on or before that date,
the Association will have the work done and bill you for the costs incurred.
Id.

total darkness beginning October 8, 1980, the night that she was
raped and robbed.
III.

THE OPINION

In an opinion authored by Justice Broussard, and joined by Chief
Justice Bird, and Justices Reynoso and Grodin, the court concluded
that the complaint did state a cause of action for negligence against
both the association and its board of directors, and that the trial court
had erred in sustaining the demurrer. However, the court affirmed
dismissal of the plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract and
breach of fiduciary duty.
The court recognized at the outset that the fundamental issue was
whether petitioners, the condominium association, and the individual
directors owed the plaintiff the same standard of care as would a
landlord in the traditional landlord-tenant relationship. This question was considered in regard to the association and the directors, in
turn.
Although the scope of a condominium association's duty to a unit
owner was a question of first impression in the court, the opinion
stated that "the association is, for all practical purposes, the project's
'landlord.' "13 Because traditional tort principles impose on landlords
the duty to exercise due care for the residents' safety in those areas
under the landlord's control, the association (which functions as a
landlord) has a similar duty of care for maintaining the common areas under its control.
The court relied on one of its own previous decisions and an appellate court case in supporting its holding. In White v. Cox,14 the court
of appeal had ruled that a condominium owner could sue the unincorporated condominium association for negligently maintaining a
sprinkler in a common area which caused injury to the owner. A
previous California Supreme Court decision, O'Connor v. Village
Green Homeowners' Association,1 5 recognized that "the [condomin-

ium] association performs all the customary business functions which
in the traditional landlord-tenant relationship rest on the landlord's
shoulders."16
The court further noted two cases which dealt with landlord-tenant relationships with factual situations similar to the instant case.
O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Corp.17 established that a landlord
has a duty to protect the tenant from criminal acts in certain situa13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 499, 723 P.2d at 576, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 459.
17 Cal. App. 3d 824, 95 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1971).
33 Cal. 3d 790, 662 P.2d 427, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1983).
O'Connor,33 Cal. 3d at 796, 662 P.2d at 431, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 324.
75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
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tions. Recognizing that the landlord-tenant relationship in the urban
residential context has been an area of expanding liability, the court
stated that "since only the landlord is in the position to secure common areas, he has a duty to protect against types of crimes of which
he has notice and which are likely to recur if the common areas are
not secure ... ."18 The court concluded that the most important factor giving rise to the landlord's liability in the O'Hara case was foreseeability. That is, the landlord allegedly knew of past attacks and of
conditions making future attacks likely.
Similarly, in Kowaitkowski v. Superior Trading Company,19 the
court of appeal (relying primarily on O'Hara) concluded that a plaintiff had alleged facts sufficient to show that her injuries were the
foreseeable result of the landlord's negligence in maintaining a common area. Again, it was alleged that complaints and prior assaults
upon tenants had given the landlord notice that injuries might result.
The Frances T court noted that here, as in O'Hara and Kowaitskowski, the Association was on notice that crimes were being committed against residents. This notice was given by correspondence
from the plaintiff and other residents, and articles in the Project's
newsletter. Furthermore, the plaintiff's unit had been burglarized
recently, and the defendants were aware of this. Because the foreseeability requirement was fulfilled, and the association stood in the
place of a landlord, the court held that the plaintiff had stated a
cause of action. Finally, the court concluded that the defendant need
not have foreseen the precise injury to the plaintiff, so long as the
possibility of this type of harm was foreseeable.20
In regard to the directors' duty of care, the court initially recognized that corporate directors cannot be held vicariously liable for
the corporation's torts in which they do not participate. The liability
of directors stems only from their own tortious conduct and not from
their status as directors per se. 21 However, directors are jointly liable
with the corporation and may be joined as defendants when they directed or participated in the tortious conduct. 22 Furthermore, direc18. O'Hare, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 802-03, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 489-90.
19. 123 Cal. App. 3d 324, 176 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1981).
20. See Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospital, 38 Cal. 3d 112, 127, 695 P.2d 653,
662, 211 Cal. Rptr. 356, 362 (1985); Kowaitkowski, 123 Cal. App. 3d at 329, 176 Cal. Rptr.
at 497.
21. United States Liab. Ins. Co. v. Haidinger-Hayes, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 586, 595, 463
P.2d 770, 775, 83 Cal. Rptr. 418, 423 (1970).
22. "The fact that directors receive no compensation for their services does not exonerate them from liability.... Corporation Code § 7230, subdivision (a) provides...

tors are liable to third persons injured by their tortious conduct
regardless of the liability of the corporation. These rules have their
roots in the law of agency, as directors are said to be the agents of
23
their corporate principle.
The court stated that to maintain a tort claim against a director in
his or her personal capacity, a plaintiff must first show that the director specifically authorized, directed, or participated in the tortious
conduct. Alternatively, if a director specifically knew, or reasonably
should have known, that some hazardous condition or activity under
his control could injure a plaintiff and he negligently failed to take or
order appropriate action to avoid the harm, he would be liable. However, a plaintiff must allege and prove that an ordinary prudent person, knowing what the director knew at that time, would have acted
differently under the circumstances.
The court recognized that the plaintiff's complaint alleged that the
defendant directors had specific knowledge of the hazardous lighting
condition and failed to take any action to avoid the harm.24 In fact,
the directors had allegedly exacerbated the situation by forcing the
plaintiff to refrain from using her exterior lighting. The court concluded that the plaintiff's complaint had alleged that each of the directors participated in the tortious activity and that this was enough
to withstand a demurrer.
In her second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged breach of contract, in that the CC&R's and the Association's bylaws obligated the
defendant to take reasonable steps to remedy the situation of inadequate exterior lighting. However, the court ruled that the plaintiff's
contention of breach of contract was without merit, because the
plaintiff had failed to allege that any provision in the writings imposed such an obligation on the defendants. In fact, the CC&R's expressly prohibited the installation of exterior lighting in common
areas except with the prior approval of the board. Therefore, the
court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action
for breach of contract.
Finally, the plaintiff alleged a third cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty. The court held that this cause of action failed for the
same reasons as the breach of contract action. The fiduciary duty of
the defendants was to enforce the CC&R's and the bylaws as they
that '[a]ny duties and liabilities set forth in this article shall apply without regard to

whether a director is compensated by the corporation.'" Frances T. v. Village Green
Owners Ass'n, 42 Cal. 3d 490, 504 n.11, 723 P.2d 573, 580 n.11, 229 Cal. Rptr. 456, 463
n.11 (1986).
23. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 317(a) (West 1977).
24. Whether the directors acted reasonably under the circumstances is a question
for the trier of fact which the supreme court did not reach. Frances T, 42 Cal. 3d at
511-12, 723 P.2d at 586, 229 Cal. Rptr. at 469.
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were written. The defendants fulfilled their duty to the plaintiff in
their fiduciary capacity by strictly enforcing the provisions in the
CC&R's that prohibited alternate exterior lighting.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In Frances T v. Village Green Homeowners' Association, the
supreme court expanded the possible liability of condominium associations and their boards of directors. In reversing the trial court's
dismissal of a cause of action for negligence against the association
and its directors, the court held that a condominium association owes
its individual owners the same standard of care that a landlord owes
his tenants. Furthermore, individual directors are jointly liable with
the corporate association if they authorize, direct, or participate in
the negligent conduct, or if they fail to act to correct a foreseeably
hazardous situation.
JEFF BOYKIN

B. A libel action by a public official may not be sustained on
appeal unless the record indicates by clear and convincing
evidence that the defendant had actual malice,
notwithstanding any lower court adjudicationof the issue:
McCoy v. Hearst Corporation.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In McCoy v. Hearst Corp.,' the court held that a public official must
prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence before damages
for a defamatory falsehood may be awarded. 2 Malice was defined as
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.3 Furthermore, the court reaffirmed that appellate courts must determine the
malice issue based upon the entire record, independent of a lower
court's determination.4
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arose as a result of the publication of three articles in the
1. 42 Cal. 3d 835, 727 P.2d 711, 231 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1986). Chief Justice Bird wrote
for the majority with Justices Broussard, Reynoso, McClosky, and Johnson concurring.
Justices Mosk and Lucas concurred in the judgment.
2. Id at 841, 727 P.2d at 715, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
3. Id
4. Id at 842-43, 727 P.2d at 715, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 522.

defendant's newspaper. The articles alleged that the former District
Attorney, Pierre Merle, along with two police officers, Frank McCoy
5
and Edward Erdelatz, obtained a conviction of a murder suspect
based primarily upon the false testimony of the suspect's cell mate,
Thomas Porter.6 The articles reported that the testimony was extracted by threats, physical abuse and promises of lenient sentencing
7
by the court.
The articles mainly focused upon a post-trial affidavit by Porter declaring that his testimony at the murder trial was false.8 Porter's affidavit stated that he gave the false testimony as a result of coercion
by the plaintiffs. 9 The affidavit also stated that Officer Merle
"coached" Porter in memorizing a story which was later given at the
trial.10 The third article claimed that the State Bar Panel had suggested some form of discipline for Merle as a result of his misconduct
in an unrelated case.'1
As a result of the articles, an attorney petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus on behalf of the convicted murderer. The attorney
filed Porter's affidavit along with the declarations of two eyewitnesses to the crime. 12 However, after the writ was filed, the attorney
general obtained another affidavit from Porter which stated that his
previous affidavit was false.' 3 The plaintiffs, Merle, McCoy, and
Erdelatz, brought this action for libel damages against the defendants, the Hearst Corp., and two of its reporters, Raul Ramirez and
Lowell Bergman. The trial court awarded damages of $4,560,000 and
the appellate court affirmed.14

III.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

The court relied upon the well-settled rule of New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan,15 which states that for a public official to maintain an action in libel, he must establish that the false statement was made
with actual malice. Actual malice exists when the statement is made
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."'16 In determining the issue of actual
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 840-41, 727 P.2d at 714, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
Id. at 841, 727 P.2d at 714, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
Id
1
Id.
Id

11.

Id

See infra note 27.

12. Id at 841, 727 P.2d at 714-15, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 521-22.
13. Id. at 841, 727 P.2d at 715, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 522.
14. Id. at 840, 727 P.2d at 714, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 521.
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
16. McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 841, 727 P.2d at 715, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 522 (quoting New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)). See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, To'rts §§ 303-305 (8th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1984); Comment, De-
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malice, the court adopted the rule from a recent Supreme Court case,
Bose Corp. v. Consumer Union of US., Inc.,J7 which imposed an affirmative duty on appellate judges to independently decide the issue
of malice after reviewing the entire record.1 8
Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring factual findings of triers of fact to be left undisturbed, was held inapplicable to the finding of actual malice.19 The court reasoned that the
malice issue in libel cases was of such a "constitutional magnitude"
that it should not be left for the jury.20 The court further declared
that it is "constitutionally inadequate to review only those portions of
the record that support the verdict."2 1 Therefore, the entire record
was reviewed in determining whether or not the defendants harbored actual malice.22
The standard for reckless disregard which constitutes actual malice
was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in St. Amant v.
Thompson.23 "[Actual malice] is not measured by whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would have investigated
fining Reckless Disregard,1 ALASKA L. REV. 297 (1984); 6 CAL.

JUR. 3D

Assault § 145

(1973 & Supp. 1986).
17. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). The Court stated:
The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is of the
convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the
Constitution, must independently decide whether the evidence in the record is
sufficient to cross the constitutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and convincing proof of "actual malice."

Id. at 511.
18. McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 842, 727 P.2d at 715, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 522. "[Tlhis court
must make an independent assessment of the entire record, but only as it pertains to
actual malice. Issues apart from this constitutional question need not be reviewed de
novo and are subject to the usual rules of appellate review." I at 842-43, 727 P.2d at
715-16, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23 (quoting Bose, 466 U.S. at 514 n.31). See generally Com-

ment, The Expanding Scope of the Appellate Review in Libel Cases-The Supreme
Court Abandons the Clearly Erroneous Standard of Review for Findings of Actual
Malice, 36 MERCER L. REV. 711 (1985).
19. McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 843, 727 P.2d at 716, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 523. FED R. CIv. P.
52(a) provides in part that "[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the

credibility of the witness." See Note, Can Civil Rule 52(a) Peacefully Co-Exist with Independent Review in Actual Malice Cases? Bose Corp. v. Consumers Unions, 60 WASH.
L. REV. 503 (1984).
20. McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 844, 727 P.2d at 717, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 524.
21. Id. at 845-46, 727 P.2d at 718, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 525 (citing Bose, 466 U.S. at 50809 and n.27).
22. Id. The court noted that this case was a prime candidate for appellate review
since Porter did not testify at trial and the jury had to rely on the record of his deposition. Id at 847 n.8, 727 P.2d at 718 n.8, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 525 n.8.

23. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).

before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the
conclusion that the defendant in fact entertainedserious doubts as to
the truth of his publication." 24 The court in the instant action had to
determine, by reviewing the record, whether or not the defendants
seriously doubted the veracity of the articles, regardless of the reasonableness of the defendants' belief.
In determining the defendants' state of mind, the court noted various factors that "in their minds directly and indirectly corroborated
Porter's allegations." 25 For one, Porter told the defendants that he
was promised leniency in exchange for his false testimony. The defendants researched this assertion and found evidence indicating that
there had been such a bargain. In addition, the defendants were informed of the plaintiff's misconduct in other cases.26 Furthermore,
the defendants spoke to an eyewitness who testified at trial. She told
them that she was uncertain as to the suspect's guilt, but that either
McCoy or Erdelatz had lied, declaring to her that eleven other eye27
witnesses had positively identified the suspect.
These factors and others, combined with Porter's testimony, led
the court to believe that the defendants did not have serious doubts
as to the truth of their publication. 28 29 Therefore, the plaintiffs
failed to establish that the defendants acted with actual malice when
they published the articles and a reversal was ordered.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The court clarified that the New York Times test for recklessness
constituting malice goes to the defendant's subjective belief in the
truth of his assertions, as opposed to the severity of his negligence.
This is significant in that it allows publishers to print articles based
upon any good faith belief they may have as long as it is not completely unfounded. If reporters were held responsible for all negligent falsities published, the press would be severely stifled. 30
24. Id. at 731 (emphasis added).

25. McCoy, 42 Cal. 3d at 854, 727 P.2d at 723, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 530 (emphasis in

original).
26. Id. at 855-56, 727 P.2d at 724-25, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 531-32. Defendant was informed by an attorney that Merle convicted a man for a crime for which another man
confessed. According to defendants' source, Merle knew of the confession but did not
reveal it at trial. Id at 848-49, 727 P.2d at 720, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 527.
27. Id at 856 n.20, 727 P.2d at 725 n.20, 231 Cal. Rptr. 532 n.20. The court noted
the defendant had read a witness's affidavit which stated that the witness recognized
the accused because she had seen him around the town before, not because she saw
him commit the murder. At the time of the photo identification "she was under the
impression she had to keep looking until she picked someone out."
28. Id at 854-58, 727 P.2d at 724-26, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 531-33.
29. Id. at 873, 727 P.2d at 737, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 544.

30. See Bird, The Role of the Press in a First Amendment Society, 20
CLARA L. REv. 1 (1980).

SANTA
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The court noted that the malice issue must be independently reevaluated at the appellate level. This gives the right of freedom of
the press even greater protection. However, plaintiffs also need protection from defamatory falsehoods. The jury should be allowed to
determine whether or not the defendant was reckless and whether
in fact the defendant seriously doubted the truth of his publication.
This is a factual determination that would best be left to the jury.
MARIANNE CHIAPUZIO

